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ABSTRACT
MEASURING THE RESILIENCE OF TRANSPORTATION NETWORKS
SUBJECT TO SEISMIC RISK
FEBRUARY 2015
MARK FURTADO, M.S.C.E., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS
Directed by Professor Alice Alipour
Infrastructure systems are essential for day-to-day life but when subject to seismic hazards, these
critical systems can experience disruptions that severely impact the communities that are so
heavily reliant upon them. After a seismic event, a resilient society should be able to minimize
disruption and recover in a timely fashion. In this thesis, a framework to quantify resilience of
highway networks to seismic events is presented. A resilient system should have the ability to
absorb the initial impact of the event, provide alternatives for damaged infrastructure, prioritize
goals and provide additional resources where needed, and restore functionality to an acceptable
level quickly. This study details the development of a model that combines structural fragility
analysis and complex network flow analysis to determine the impacts of a seismic event on the
network functionality. The highway network of the San Francisco Bay area and the Oakland area
are selected as the test bed for the developed methodologies. To account for the effect of different
improvement strategies before and after earthquake, an original highway network is compared
with several scenario-based models with retrofits and improved repair conditions. The costs
associated with each event is calculated including costs from the actual repair of the bridge and
costs experienced by network users due to decreased traffic performance is estimated. Using the
probability of each event, the seismic risk can also be calculated. Post-event scenarios are
compared and include planning activities that contribute to effective and rapid recovery
strategies. For this case, a series of repair acceleration techniques are applied in order to shorten
the repair time and restore the network to an acceptable level of functionality with minimum
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resources. This thesis provides network stakeholders with a means to determine the resilience of
their network which will provide appropriate decision making tools that will limit disruptions due
to earthquakes in a cost effective manner.

v

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
ABSTRACT………………………………………………………………………….......iv
LIST OF TABLES……………………………………………………………………...viii
LIST OF FIGURES………………………………………………………………………ix
CHAPTER
1. INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION ...................................................................... 1
1.1. Introduction ...................................................................................................... 1
1.2.

Overview of the Thesis ................................................................................. 2

2. RISK AND RESILIENCE ASSESSMENT ................................................................... 6
2.1. Impact of Earthquake on Infrastructure Systems ............................................. 6
2.2. Risk Analysis and Resilience Assessment ....................................................... 8
3. SEISMIC RISK ANALYSIS ........................................................................................ 15
3.1. Introduction .................................................................................................... 15
3.1.1. Test Bed Highway Network............................................................ 16
3.1.2. Seismic Hazard and Vulnerability Analysis ................................... 20
3.1.3. Network Performance Measures ..................................................... 24
3.3. Seismic Risk Analysis.................................................................................... 28
4. POST-EVENT PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT ..................................................... 40
4.1. Seismic Resilience Assessment of Highway Networks ................................. 40

vi

4.2. Robustness and Redundancy.......................................................................... 43
4.3. Repair Strategies ............................................................................................ 45
4.4. Resourcefulness and Rapidity ........................................................................ 48
5. PRE-EVENT DAMAGE MITIGATION ..................................................................... 59
5.1. Introduction .................................................................................................... 59
5.2. Retrofit Methods ............................................................................................ 61
5.3. Retrofitting Standards .................................................................................... 64
5.4. Retrofit Optimization Algorithms .................................................................. 68
5.4.1. Genetic Algorithms ......................................................................... 69
5.4.2. Artificial neural networks ............................................................... 71
5.4.3. Two-Stage Stochastic Model .......................................................... 73
5.5. Retrofit Optimization Study Area .................................................................. 78
5.6. Discussion of Results ..................................................................................... 80
6. CONCLUSIONS........................................................................................................... 92
REFERENCES…………………………………………………………………………100

vii

LIST OF TABLES

Table

Page

3.1: Percentages of bridges in each damage state for one of simulations of the scenario
earthquake………………………………………………………………… ........ ……….31
4.1: Connectivity indices for the highway networks of San Francisco, Los Angeles,
Reno and Boston .............................................................................................................. 53
4.2: Oklahoma I-40 Bridge repair acceleration using ABC techniques ......................................... 53
4.3: Example of bridge repair acceleration after the Northridge earthquake using
Incentives ......................................................................................................................... 53
4.4: Improvement over baseline for total costs at the end of the repair process………..… .......... 54
5.1: Median PGA for MSC bridges before and after retrofitting......................................... .......... 84
5.2: Number of bridges damaged before and after column jacketing…………….………. .......... 84
5.3: Fragility curve parameters for the retrofitted bridges………………………..………. .......... 84
5.4: Drivers’ delay, retrofit, repair and total costs for retrofitting the Oakland
network under initial conditions………………………………………..………............. 85
5.5: Bridge retrofit cost reduction for varying risk scenarios ……………………………... ........ 85
5.6: Optimal bridge retrofit for varying cost per retrofit ............................................................... 85
5.7: Optimal bridge retrofit for varying retrofit effectiveness...………………….………. .......... 85

viii

LIST OF FIGURES
Figure

Page

2.1 Contributions of resilience components on the resilience curve..................................... ......... 14
3.1 Links and nodes representing the highway network of the study area..................................... 32
3.2 Location of four epicenters on San Andreas and Hayward faults................................... ......... 32
3.3 Contour of PHA for an earthquake of 7.5 magnitude at Site 2……......………………. ......... 33
3.4 Liquefaction susceptibility map of the San Francisco Bay area……….……………… ......... 33
3.5 Location and distribution of bridges in the study area……………….………………... ......... 34
3.6 Fragility curve envelopes for the 28 category of bridges……..……………………….. ......... 34
3.7 HAZUS-MH restoration curves for highway bridges……………….………………… ......... 35
3.8 A realization of bridge damage states for the scenario earthquake .......................................... 36
3.9 A realization of link damage states for the scenario earthquake .............................................. 36
3.10 A realization of post-event traffic flow for the scenario earthquake………………….......... 36
3.11 Frequency of direct costs (top) and daily indirect costs (bottom) by moment
magnitude at site 2 ............................................................................................................ 37
3.12 Frequency of direct costs (top) and daily indirect costs (bottom) by site
Location…………………………………………………………………...……….......... 38
3.13 Seismic risk curves for the direct (top) and daily indirect costs (bottom)…................. ........ 39
3.14 Change in indirect costs over time following a scenario earthquake at site 2....……... ........ 39
4.1 Cumulative probabilities for direct (left) and indirect cost (right)……. ……………... ......... 55
4.2 Highway networks for (a) San Francisco, (b) Los Angeles, (c) Reno,
and (d) Boston…………………………………………………………………….. ......... 55
4.3 Effect of different repair strategies on traffic delay after the earthquake ................................ 55
4.4 Number of bridges in each damage state throughout repair .................................................... 56
4.5 Performance curve for network delay with incentivization (top) and with
Incentivization and accelerated bridge construction technique (bottom) ........................ 57

ix

4.6 Total cost including incentivizing (left) and combination of incentivizing and ABC
technique (right)………………………………… ….…………………………….. ........ 58
4.7 Comparison between repair processes with and without prioritization
techniques……………………………………………………................................. ......... 58
5.1 Flow chart for the values of V1 and V2 (recreated from Seismic
Retrofitting Manual) ........................................................................................................ 86
5.2 Fragility curves for the bridge with steel jacketing.................................................................. 88
5.3 Highway network of the test bed (Oakland) for the damage mitigation
strategies ………………………………………………………………………….. ......... 88
5.4 Delay, retrofit, repair and total costs for retrofitting the Oakland network
under initial conditions ..................................................................................................... 89
5.5 Bridges selected for retrofit in the initial scenario……………………………………. .......... 89
5.6 Total costs for retrofitting the Oakland network for varying risk scenarios………….. .......... 91
5.7 Total costs for retrofitting the Oakland network for varying cost per retrofit ......................... 91
5.8 Total costs for retrofitting the Oakland network for varying retrofit
effectiveness....................................................................................................................... 91
5.9 Network performance with and without retrofit for a 7.5 Mw earthquake
Near Oakland ...................................................................................................................... 91

x

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION
1.1. Introduction
It is crucial for a modern society that critical infrastructure systems such as water
distribution, power gridlines, transportation networks, and communication services run
smoothly. Critical infrastructure systems are required to maintain a healthy economy,
allow reliable transportation and to provide the day-to-day needs for communities. After
a natural disaster however, these infrastructure systems can experience damage that can
severely decrease their performance. This problem is exacerbated by the fact that the
performance of these systems is of greater importance during and directly after the
disaster for emergency response and recovery actions.
Transportation networks are one of the most important types of civil infrastructure
systems. Transportation networks let users commute to conduct their everyday activities,
allow for emergency vehicles to perform time critical duties, and provide businesses with
a means to transport goods among other important functions. When a transportation
network is damaged, the local community can suffer costs. In some cases, when the
network is an important part of a larger network, the losses even propagate to
communities further away. After a network is damaged, until different segments are
repaired, the indirect costs associated with its normal functionality accumulate over time.
In seismically prone regions, performance of transportation networks could be
substantially disrupted due to failures to its components such as roadways, tunnels,
bridges, and culverts. Bridges in particular are susceptible to the effects of seismic events
as they can be damaged by ground shaking, liquefaction and landslides. Also, the repair
1

time for bridges can be expensive and lengthy. Furthermore, bridges normally act as
“bottlenecks” in case of damage and can hinder the emergency responses after disruptive
events. In the United States, the Loma Prieta (1989) and Northridge (1994) earthquakes
damaged important highway bridges which brought on heavy repair costs and large
traffic delays.
Performance of transportation networks under seismic hazards highlights the need
to study the concept of risk and resilience. Risk is a function of the possible seismic
events, the probability of occurrence each event, and the outcomes of the events.
Resilience is the ability of a system to absorb the impact of an event then recover
afterwards. Resilience is a complex measure which can be seen as the aggregate of its
components. These components include the expected level of physical damage after an
event, the topographical reliability of the network layout, the prioritization important
goals and the speed of which the network recovers to an acceptable level. While the
concept of resilience has existed for decades, the applicability to complex systems such
as transportation networks is a recent and understudied topic. This thesis will concentrate
on applying the concepts of resilience to transportation networks under seismic risk. It
aims to provide efficient methods of evaluating the resilience of transportation networks
so that the owners of the network can gauge its vulnerability, discover weaknesses in the
network, and increase preparedness in order to limit the potentially large direct and
indirect costs that an earthquake can carry.
1.2.Overview of the Thesis
The goal of this thesis is to quantitatively assess the risk and resilience of transportation
networks subjected to seismic hazard and to develop methods that provide decision
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makers with the required tools to make pre-event decisions that can improve the
resilience of the network. First in this thesis, an overview on the topics of risk and
resilience will be provided. Following this, the methods used to quantify said risk and
resilience will be detailed and a case study demonstrating these methods will be detailed.
To help decision makers make pre-event decisions, a method of prioritizing bridge
retrofits will be detailed and demonstrated in another case study.
Chapter 2 concentrates on the topics of risk and resilience and provides methods
to quantify each. A comprehensive literature review on the resilience of civil
infrastructure systems is given to provide an overview on the topic. For this purpose, first
the historical disruptions to infrastructure networks under natural hazards have been
reviewed. The chapter continues with a look at the vulnerability of bridges and explains
the integration of the traffic demand model to the damaged network. For a system wide
analysis, modeling the damage to each bridge in detail would be prohibitively expensive.
For this purpose, the damage state limit state are defined for a set of 28 bridge classes and
then the fragility curves are utilized to determine the probability of each damage state for
a given bridge. This is done using the characteristics of the bridge and the level of
shaking at the bridge site or the amount of displacement from liquefaction. The level of
damage is tied into the ability for the bridge to carry traffic. With that, the traffic model is
updated using a four step model to estimate the changes in the capacity of the network
before and after the earthquake. Furthermore, the concept of resilience and its historical
applications is introduced. An in-depth interpretation of the different components of
resilience is presented each with its own quantitative measure. Resilience is then linked to
the costs associated with a given earthquake scenario. Costs come from both the actual
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repair costs of the bridge and the costs from the change in network performance after the
earthquake.
In Chapter 3, the available methodologies to analyze the seismic risk of the
spatially distributed systems have been discussed and a review of the effects of
prioritization and alternative repair techniques on restoration of the functionality of the
network after extreme events has been conducted. The chapter ends with a case study that
takes place in the San Francisco Bay area. The San Francisco Bay area is a populous
region subject to very high seismic hazard making it an ideal location for a test bed. The
highway network in the study area will be subjected to a series of earthquakes in order to
evaluate the post-earthquake behavior of the network. A risk assessment is presented for
the given area utilizing a range of earthquakes from nearby faults. Then, the resilience of
the network is studied. Lastly, the effects of prioritizing bridges for repair are explored in
greater depth.
Chapter 4 will analyze the options available for retrofitting against seismic
hazards and provides a method to select bridges for retrofit based on their importance in
the network. A history of bridge retrofitting will be collected and a list of common
retrofit techniques will be given that includes advantages and disadvantages to each
technique. Next, some optimization methods considered for the study are detailed and the
technique used in this thesis will be justified and explained. A case study in the Oakland
area will be conducted that selects retrofits based on the risk in the area. Also shown in
the study will be sensitivity of the costs to factors such as cost of retrofitting and risk.

4

The last chapter reviews the conclusions for the thesis and discusses possible
future developments. A summary of the thesis will be collected and the possible uses and
potential impact of the study will be given.

5

CHAPTER 2
RISK AND RESILIENCE ASSESSMENT
2.1. Impact of Earthquake on Infrastructure Systems
The economy of the modern societies and the well-being of its citizens depend on the
uninterrupted and reliable functionality of its infrastructure systems. According to the
report of the U.S. President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection (PCCIP1997), the nation’s critical infrastructure systems provide a reliable flow of products and
services essential to the defense and economic security of the society. Transportation
networks are categorized as one of the critical infrastructure systems as their physical
damage and functionality loss not only hinder every day residential and commercial
activities but also impair post disaster evacuation, response, and recovery. Furthermore,
considering the interdependent nature of the critical infrastructure systems (Rinaldi et al.
2001), the loss of functionality in transportation network can also adversely affect
interdependent networks such as telecommunication and health networks (Chang et al.
2013). Highway bridges are one of the most critical components of the transportation
network acting as “bottlenecks” in case of any disruption or failure in their service.
Seismic events impose a large hazard to highway transportation network as they can
adversely affect a large portion of this spatially distributed system. Earthquake prone
areas bear the risk of very large losses due to seismic events. The estimated annualized
earthquake loss in the United States has been determined by FEMA to be 5.3 billion in
2005. A large portion of the annualized cost is concentrated along the west coast with
nearly 40% of the cost in the Los Angeles and San Francisco Bay area alone (FEMA
2008).
6

Historically, seismic events have caused major disturbances to transportation
networks. After the 1995 Great Hanshin earthquake, the Port of Kobe in Japan suffered
damage that severely limited its ability to move cargo for two years causing severe and
possibly long-lasting impact to the area (Chang 2000). The 1989 Loma Prieta earthquake
stressed the public transit systems as the highway bridges were damaged and users began
using public transit as an alternative (SPUR 2010). Los Angeles saw major disruptions to
the highway network after the 1994 Northridge earthquake. Most notably, portions of the
Santa Monica Freeway, an extremely busy highway with average daily traffic being
about 261,000 around the time of the earthquake, were shut down until bridge repair
could be done (US DOT 2002).
Predicting the effects of earthquakes on transportation networks can be difficult.
Post-earthquake traffic flows are more difficult to predict than in other emergencies such
as hurricane or nuclear hazards as earthquakes offer no prior warning and are coupled
with immediate damage to infrastructure (Chang et al. 2010). Bridges are especially
important when considering earthquakes because the supports of bridges are often located
near bodies of water or steep slopes which means particular susceptibility to landslides
and liquefaction. The repair cost that is associated with liquefaction is generally high
since liquefaction can lead to high damage states (Kiremidjian et al. 2007).
Substantial research has been focused on evaluating the impact of seismic events
on the transportation networks. These studies include the post-earthquake flow models to
estimate the functionality of the network (Nojima and Sugoito 2000, Lee et al. 2011,
Chang et al. 2012), development of annual risk curves using probabilistic scenario based
models (Shiraki et al. 2007, Stergiou and Kirmidjian 2010, Alipour 2010), integrating
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transportation network and regional economic models to estimate the direct and indirect
costs associated with failure of bridges in transportation networks (Cho et al. 2000,
Tatano and Tsuchiya 2008, Danielle and Love 2010, Rose et al. 2011 and Furtado and
Alipour 2014a), and proposing prioritization methods for bridge retrofit to enhance the
functionality of the networks (Zhou et al. 2010, Chang et al. 2012, Bocchini et al. 2012,
Rokneddin et al. 2013, Venkittaraman and Banerjee 2013, and Furtado and Alipour
2014b). Most of these studies have suggested strategies for asset protection and
vulnerability reduction; however, recently there is an increasing emphasis on the
resilience of the transportation networks, which is defined as the ability of the system to
withstand, adapt, and rapidly recover from the effect of disruptive events (Turnquist and
Vurgin 2013). The recognition of the importance of this issue has caused national
security communities seek for alternatives to ensure the infrastructure resilience. The
examples of policy shift include the U.S. Department of Homeland Security National
Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP: DHS, 2009) and Presidential Policy Directive 8
(PPD-8 2011), which contain explicit language calling for increasing the resilience of the
nation’s critical infrastructure against the threats that pose the greatest risk to the security
of the nation, including acts of terrorism, cyber-attacks, pandemics and catastrophic
natural disasters. Fragility Analysis of Bridges
2.2. Risk Analysis and Resilience Assessment
The resilience of networks and communities has been a topic of interest in the past few
years where it complimented seismic risk assessment and risk management studies.
However, resilience is a concept that is difficult to describe quantitatively. The ability to
quantify resilience could be useful to management agencies to better understand which
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aspects of a network should be improved in order to better deal with the consequences of
earthquakes. The novelty of the current research is to develop a holistic framework to
quantitatively measure different dimensions of seismic resilience in a large transportation
network.
The term resilience has been used in many fields and, though the core concept
remains the same, no singular definition has been universally accepted. The Oxford
English Dictionary (2010) defines resilience as the action or an act of rebounding or
springing back; rebound, recoil. Holling (1973) was the first to define resilience is a
measure of the persistence of systems and of their ability to absorb change and
disturbance and still maintain the same relationships between populations or state
variables. Pimm (1984) introduced a definition of resilience as a speed measure for the
system to return to its stability after a disturbance. This definition although initially
applied to ecological systems, made a significant impact on other fields. Later the
definition of resilience was also applied to the actual speed of recovery. The latter
definition has been found useful to investigate both short-term disruptions due to extreme
events (e.g., Tierney, 1997, Bruneau et al., 2003, and Rose, 2004) and long-term changes
(Dovers and Handmer, 1992, and ASCE, 2013). This highlights the importance of time as
a factor in recovery which primarily distinguishes resilience from risk. The PPD-8 (2011)
calls resilience as the ability of a system to adapt to changing conditions, withstand
disruptions, and rapidly recover from them. This definition is very close to the one
proposed by Rose (2009), which divides the resilience into two levels: i) static resilience
as the ability of a system to maintain function after a catastrophic event, and ii) dynamic
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resilience as the speed by which the system recovers from a severe shock to achieve a
desired state of functionality.
Recently there has been an exponential increase in the topic of resilience across
many different fields following a string of disasters such as the Loma Prieta earthquake
(1989), hurricane Katrina (2005), the recent financial crisis (2008), and the Tohoku
earthquake (2011) (Park et al. 2013). Disaster resilience has been the topic discussed by
the disaster roundtable under the topic of grand challenges in science and technology and
put emphasis on pre-emergency recovery planning (2005). A workshop funded by the
National Science Foundation and conducted by the National Research Council labeled
community resilience framework as one of five grand challenges in earthquake
engineering, stating that such a framework also could advance our understanding of both
the direct and indirect impacts of earthquakes so that community-level interactions and
impacts can better characterized (2011).
A system’s resilience is largely dependent on i) the state of its components also
called their vulnerability, ii) the hazards that it may be exposed to, and iii) the
consequences of such hazards given the state of the system. Another concept very close
to resilience is the risk which could be characterized as a function of three main factors: i)
nature and probability of occurrence of a destructive event, ii) state of the system in terms
of resilience, and iii) probability of different outcomes or consequences of the events
under consideration. Upon identification of the most important components of the
system, the risk associated to them can be quantified by a series of predictive models that
express the probability and severity of damage due to destructive events. As it relates to
seismic risk analysis, the hazards include the probability and the intensity of ground
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motion, liquefaction, landslides and other hazards. The vulnerability would relate to the
expected level of damage that will occur in components of the system for a given set of
seismic events. How exactly resilience ties into risk analysis has been a subject of debate.
The resilience of a system is sometimes viewed as an outcome of vulnerability; a system
has a certain amount of vulnerability and resilience is the reaction to the events the
system is vulnerable to. Other times, resilience is viewed as a process which at least
partially bears the responsibility of damage mitigation (Cutter et al. 2008). In this study,
risk analysis and resilience will be looked at as interconnected ideas. Risk analysis is
useful for estimating how much damage is expected to occur while resilience can help
define which aspects of a system are most critical to recovery. Time for recovery is also
an aspect which is often more important in resilience than in risk as the characteristics of
resilience are often defined using time as a dimension. While still a fairly new topic, there
have been studies in the resilience assessment of networks across a range of disciplines.
Rose (2004) used the concept of economic resilience and applied it to damage due to
earthquakes in water distribution network in the Portland Metro area. Chang and
Shinozuka (2004) discussed a quantitative measure for resilience and applied it to the
Memphis water system. Improving on the Chang and Shinozuka (2004) model, Chang et
al. (2008) measured the resilience of the Los Angeles lifeline network. Cimellaro et al.
(2010), following similar framework, evaluated the resilience of a hospital network using
the change in healthy population as a measure of resilience. Omer et al. (2009) examined
the global internet infrastructure system using the ratio of information flow before and
after a disturbance. Bocchini and Frangopol (2012) used resilience and cost as objectives
in deciding scheduling for interventions for bridges on a simple highway network.
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According to Haimes (2009), the vulnerability assessment mainly contributes to a
system’s protection, whereas the resilience assessment goes beyond the system’s
protection and additionally includes system’s recovery following extreme events. As a
case in point, hardening of a system against region-specific hazards (i.e., pre-event
investment) may reduce the vulnerability of the system, but if the recovery needs are not
properly addressed, the resilience of the system in terms of recovery time and cost will
not always be improved. Understanding of the needs of broad use of resilience ranging
from the bridge structure to other structures to infrastructures to networks to
communities, an operational definition of resilience should enable its measurement by
meeting the following requirements for which metrics are either available or needed: i)
building on national priorities and presidential policy directives (PPD-8 2011, PPD-21
2013), ii) modeling the disturbing events considering their uncertainties as stochastic
processes, iii) knowledge of initial capacity or capacity after event of structure/system,
iv) accounting for the changes in time due to aging or improvements that will be
considered in the system, v) considering the abilities to prepare and plan for, absorb, or
adapt to the hazard (NRC 2013), v) including the performances of different entities in the
infrastructure system such as the physical assets, people, economy, and community
(MCEER 2010), vi) define the system performance in terms of objectives and outputs,
vii) integrating models to account for the rate of recovery over time, and viii) being able
to connect to other relevant topics such as reliability and risk analysis
Bruneu et al (2003) describes a resilient community as one which has reduced
failure probabilities, reduced consequences from failures and reduced time to recovery.
These characteristics are ensured if the system has four “R’s” for resilience: robustness,
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redundancy, resourcefulness and rapidity. According to this definition, robustness is the
ability the system or elements to withstand stress without the loss of functionality,
redundancy is the ability to provide alternatives and make substitutions for damaged
elements in a system, resourcefulness is the ability to prioritize actions and supply
resources (human, monetary and otherwise) to achieve goals and rapidity is a measure of
how quickly these goals can be achieved. Also laid out are four dimensions aspects of
resilience: technical, organizational, social and economic. The technical aspect measures
the performance of physical systems after an earthquake event. The organizational aspect
is the ability for organizations to react appropriately to earthquakes and perform critical
functions. The social aspect refers to the ability to minimize harm done to society itself.
The Economic aspect is the ability to minimize economic losses due to earthquakes.
Figure 2.1 depicts the components of resilience on a system performance curve.
Assuming the system is 100% functional before the event, the severity of the initial drop
is dependent on both the robustness and redundancy of the network. Depending on the
ability of the system to absorb the shock and find alternatives to accommodate the traffic
demand, the percent drop in functionality will be affected. Being interlinked concepts, no
discrete portion of the drop can be applied to only robustness or redundancy by itself.
Shown in the graph are two separate curves, the one on top is where goals are prioritized
and additional resources are allocated and one without these properties. The former
shows a more resourceful repair process which prioritizes goal. tf occurs when the repair
curve meets the rapidity performance criteria. At this point, the network reaches an
acceptable level of performance. What exactly qualifies as an acceptable level of
performance depends on the standards of the managerial bodies responsible. The
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performance of the bridge network can eventually return to the pre-event state if
everything is repaired, remain below pre-event levels if some aspects are beyond repair,
or even rise above the pre-event levels if improvements are made to the network (Ayyub
2013). For this thesis, it will be assumed that the performance will return to the pre-event
level. The area between the two curves is an indicator of the system resourcefulness.

Figure 2.1: Contributions of resilience components on the resilience curve
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CHAPTER 3
SEISMIC RISK ANALYSIS
3.1. Introduction
For a long time, risk has been measured as the product of hazard and vulnerability. As it
relates to seismic risk analysis, the hazards include the probability and the intensity of
ground motion, liquefaction, landslides and other hazards. The vulnerability would relate
to the expected level of damage in structures that will occur for a given set of hazards
(Musson 2000).
Because of the nearly limitless possible hazard scenarios and network
configurations, measuring vulnerability balances accuracy and breadth against
complexity and resource intensiveness. Murray et al. (2008) defines four main
classifications of approaches for evaluating the vulnerability of the network: scenariospecific, strategy-specific, simulation-based and mathematical modeling methodologies.
The scenario-specific assessment looks at a small set of specific disruption scenarios.
Strategy-specific assessment looks at scenarios where a structured loss of facilities is
expected. The simulation-based approach works under the assumption that if enough
simulations are run, a good representation of the vulnerability can be presented.
Mathematical assessment seeks out extreme scenarios (worst-case and best-case
scenarios). This paper will use a simulation based approach to estimate the seismic risk in
the case study.
Analyzing seismic hazards and vulnerability can provide useful and varied insight
for network owners. Currently available research explores a range of different
performance criteria, geographical locations, seismic sources and general methodologies.
15

Shiraki et al. (2007) created risk curves to estimate the annual probability of network
delay due to earthquakes affecting the Los Angeles area. Alipour and colleagues (2010,
2011, and 2013) developed a multiple hazard framework to estimate the functionality of
the Los Angeles and Orange County areas after earthquakes. Rossi et al. (2012), using a
test network in north-east Italy, performed seismic risk analysis to compare different
retrofitting scenarios in order to prioritize groups of bridges for retrofit. Mehary and
Dusicka (2012) developed a seismic risk assessment model for major trucking routes in
Oregon which indicates that an earthquake could disable trading route for extended
periods of time and cause other sever economic and social impacts. Chang et al. (2012)
demonstrated a model used on the Memphis metropolitan areas road network that looks
at the vulnerability of the network in terms of its ability to supply capacity for evacuation.
In this study, the seismic risk of the San Francisco Bay area will be analyzed. For this
purpose the topology of the network will be created using graph theory and the
fundamentals of network science and traffic analysis will be used to measure the
performance of the network after the event. Finally, the direct and indirect costs
associated with a set of scenario earthquakes will be estimated and the risk curves will be
generated.
3.1.1. Test Bed Highway Network
The San Francisco bay area is an ideal location to test of the resilience of a transportation
network because of its high seismic risk, bustling urban population, reliance on highway
bridges, and the wealth of data available after the Loma Prieta Earthquake. The study
area will include five counties in the bay area: San Francisco, Alameda, San Mateo,
Marin and Contra Costa. The National Highway Planning Network (NHPN) database is
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used to collect geographic, topographic, and connectivity information for the network
under study. Within the study area are 910 traffic analysis zones (TAZs). TAZs aggregate
socio-economical information within their borders from which productions (total number
of origins) and attractions (total number of destinations) are generated based on this
information. The highway network is generalized as a graph which consists of a set of
node and links. Nodes are important points in the network such as intersections, trip end
locations and ramps. Links are roadways that connect the nodes together. Links should
contain information important to the traffic model such as capacity and travel speed.
Figure 3.1 presents the location of the links and nodes in the study area.
To determine the effects of bridge damage to the driving public, first a model that
can predict driver behavior has to be created. The model should be able to determine the
origin and destinations of the trips, the route the drivers take and the frequency of trips.
For this purpose, a four step model which consists of trip generation, trip distribution,
mode choice, and traffic assignment steps is used.
Trip generation determines how often trips originate and end in different traffic
analysis zones (TAZ) across the network. Trip origins and destinations are generalized
such that trip ends occur in the geometric center of each traffic analysis zone. TAZs that
share common borders are connected by a link with a free flow travel speed of 30 miles
per hour. Attraction and production data was taken from the 2009 update to the Regional
Transportation Plan (RTP), a transportation project in the San Francisco Bay area that
helps define future policy and investment in the area. The tables include predicted trip
ends for each of the 910 TAZs in the bay area across 5 time period in the day: AM early
(midnight - 6 am), AM peak (6 - 10 am), Midday (10 am - 3 pm), PM peak (3 - 7 pm)
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and PM late (7 pm - midnight). The study area of the RTP is larger than the study area of
the model in this paper (containing 4 more of the surrounding counties) so the traffic
from the counties that are in the RTP area but not in this study’s area will be included as
external stations.
After the total number of attractions and productions are determined, the trip
distribution step pairs the origins and destinations so that the number of trips between
every two TAZs can be determined using the gravity model. In the gravity model, the
TAZs that are closest to a production zone will generally attract a large portion of the
trips compared to a zone further away. The formula for the gravity model is as follows:
𝑇𝑖𝑖 = 𝑃𝑖 𝐴𝑗 𝑓𝑖𝑖 /(∑𝑗′ 𝐴𝑗′ 𝑓𝑖𝑗′ )

(3.1)

where Tij is the amount of trips from origin i to destination j, Pi is the number of trips

originating from i, Aj is the constant to balance the trips destined to zone j, and fij is the
distance decay factor which is inversely related to the zone separation in a form of
gamma, power, or exponential factor.
The mode choice step gives the method of travel for each trip be it by car, train or
any other mode of transportation. Since the study is concentrated on highway traffic, the
relevant data is the percentage of drivers for each trip purpose. Mode choice is based on
the data from the Metropolitan Transportation Commission (MTC) and for the San
Francisco Bay area 60% for the total trips are conducted by car.
The traffic assignment predicts the paths that the users on the network will take
for each trip. Users on the network will try to select the paths with the least cost so an
algorithm has to be used that collects the shortest paths. The algorithm generates all-ornothing path definition which is a path choice where only one path is used between each
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node pair for every user going between the same O-D pair. In actuality, if every user
taking a trip between a specific origin-destination pair took the same path, the roadways
on the path may become loaded to the point where congestion increases the travel time.
At this point, previously calculated shortest path may not be the shortest path anymore so
all-or-nothing assignment is run again utilizing a portion of the previous assignments link
flow. This process is repeated until the network reaches user equilibrium: the state where
no user can decrease travel costs by changing paths. The travel time of each link after
congestion is calculated using the Bureau of Public Roads formula which is:
𝑣 4

𝑡 = 𝑡𝑖 � 1 + 0.15 �𝑐 � �

(3.2)

where t is the travel time of the link, ti is the free flow travel time, v is the volume on the
link and c is the capacity of the link.
To identify the shortest path a modified version of the Dijkstra's algorithm has
been used. The time it takes to run a basic Dijkstra’s algorithm is proportional to the
square of the number of nodes in the network. This means that for very large networks or
studies that require many simulations, the model can take a prohibitively long time to run.
However, the algorithm can be optimized by using sparse matrices. A sparse matrix only
considers the non-zero values in the matrix. In a network model of the scale used in this
study, the number of links is far fewer than the square of the number of nodes so a sparse
matrix is used which offers the ability to ignore some of the updating that the algorithm
would have to process.
Traffic demand after an earthquake can be modeled as fixed or variable. In fixed
traffic demand assumption, the demand is unchanged from before the event. In variable
demand, the demand may increase or decrease after the event. Whether the demand
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increases, decreases or remains the same depends on regional behavior. In the case of
decreasing demand, it is possible that the travel time between links also decreases
(though not necessarily so). In a fixed scenario, the travel time will increase due to the
damaged state of infrastructure. In the case of increasing demand, one could expect an
increase in travel time due to both congestion and damaged infrastructure (Kiremidjian et
al. 2007). The cost of traffic delay is calculated differently from agency to agency.
Overall though, the cost is usually calculated as the product of traffic delay and value of
time. The value of time is often based on the average hourly wage in a particular region.
3.1.2. Seismic Hazard and Vulnerability Analysis
The San Andreas Fault is a source of great seismic threat to the San Francisco Bay area.
Historically, some of the most important seismic events originate from the San Andreas
Fault. The Loma Prieta earthquake, a 7.1 magnitude earthquake that struck south of the
San Francisco bay in 1989, severely disrupted the transportation network in the bay area.
A span of the San-Francisco-Oakland Bay Bridge collapsed closing the bridge for over a
month until the bridge was repaired. Being the busiest bridge in the area, this greatly
affected network users who would rely on this bridge for their commute and other
purposes (Plakfer and Galloway 1989). For this study the scenario earthquakes on both
San Andreas and Hayward faults has been considered. To present the risk from these two
faults, four representative earthquake sources were selected: three sites are located on the
San Andreas Fault and one on the Hayward fault. Fault lines and rupture locations are
shown in Figure 3.2. Six different scenarios with moment magnitudes ranging from 6.0 to
8.5 with 0.5 steps has been considered, which makes for a total of 24 scenario
earthquakes. For the purpose of seismic risk analyses, the range of earthquake scenarios
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utilizing all 4 epicenter locations and the magnitudes has been identified. The
probabilities of each scenario are then considered to determine the risk. The USGS
earthquake probability mapping tool based on the 2008 USGS-National Seismic Hazard
Mapping Project update was the source for earthquake probabilities in the area. From
there, the probabilities were divided amongst the San Andreas and Hayward fault based
on the relative probabilities that each fault will produce an earthquake.
The rupture length for each earthquake is taken as a function of the moment
magnitude of the earthquake. The following equations are adapted from Wells and
Coopersmith (1994) for a strike slip fault.
log(𝑆𝑆𝑆) = 0.74 ∗ 𝑀 − 3.55

(3.3)

where SRL is the median rupture length in km, M is the moment magnitude, the standard
deviation of the logarithm of the rupture length is equal to 0.23.
The Campbell (1997) attenuation relationship is used here to evaluate the level of
ground motion intensity at the location of each bridge.
ln 𝑃𝑃𝑃 = −3.512 + 0.904𝑀 − 1.328 ln �𝑅 2 + (0.149 exp(0.647𝑀))2
+[1.125 − 0.112 ln 𝑅 − 0.0957𝑀]𝐹 + [0.440 − 0.171 ln 𝑅]𝑆𝑆𝑆
+[0.405 − 0.222 ln 𝑅 ]𝑆𝐻𝐻

𝐿𝐿(𝑆𝐴𝐻 ) = 𝐿𝐿(𝑃𝑃𝑃) + 𝑐1 + 𝑐2 tanh[𝑐3 (𝑀 − 4.7)] + (𝑐4 + 𝑐5 𝑀)𝑅

+0.5 𝑐6 𝑆𝑆𝑆 + 𝑐6 𝑆𝐻𝐻 + 𝑐7 tanh(𝑐8 𝐷) (1 − 𝑆𝐻𝐻 ) + 𝑓𝑆𝑆 (𝐷)

(3.4a)

(3.5b)

where PHA is the peak horizontal acceleration in g, M in the moment magnitude, R is the
site-to-source distance, F is 0 for strike slip faulting and 1 otherwise, SSR is 1 for soft rock
sites and 0 otherwise, SHR is 1 for hard rock sites and 0 otherwise, SAH is the median
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value of horizontal spectral ordinates, D is the depth to the basement rock, cx are
coefficients based on period and fSA(D) is a function based on the depth of the basement
rock. Figure 3.3 shows the distribution of PHA values for a 7.5 magnitude earthquake
occurring at site 2.
In addition to the ground motion, liquefaction can pose a serious threat to
transportation networks. San Francisco is particularly affected by liquefaction as a very
large portion of the area has soil conditions that make for high liquefaction susceptibility.
The HAZUS-MH (2012) methodology will be used to determine the expected peak
ground deformation and damage associated with these deformations. The methodology
considers the soil conditions at the site and the peak ground acceleration (PGA) that the
site is subjected to. Each site has a relative susceptibility rating based on soil conditions.
The ratings are broken up into the following categories: none, very low, low, medium,
high and very high. Two types of peak ground displacements are considered: lateral
spreading and settlement. Lateral spreading is dependent on the susceptibility, PGA and
water depth at a site. Settlement is based on the susceptibility and the probability of
liquefaction for each susceptibility class. Using the greater of the two displacements,
fragility curves similar to those based on shaking are used which instead give the
probability of failure for PGD. Figure 3.4 presents the liquefaction susceptibility map for
the study area (USGS 2000).This combined with the damage from ground shaking will be
used to determine the overall damage in the network.
Bridge information is taken from the National Bridge inventory (NBI). After
parsing the NBI for bridges near highway links, there are 2424 bridges in the network.
Figure 3.5 presents the location and distribution of all the bridges on the study area. Since
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the developed network contains thousands of bridges, it would be impractical to conduct
individual finite element analysis on each individual bridge to measure the response to
every possible earthquake scenario. For this purpose bridges which share common
characteristics are separated into categories following the 28 categories provided by
HAZUS-MH (2012), a loss estimation software package developed by the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). The characteristics are based on bridge
geometry, construction materials and whether or not the bridge was designed with
seismic hazard as a major concern. To estimate the likelihood of the bridges damaged
under specific earthquake scenarios, the concept of fragility curves has been used. The
fragility curves describe the probability of a given level of damage for a given ground
motion intensity measure. The fragility function is defined as follows:
𝐹𝑘 (𝑎|𝜁𝑘 , 𝑐𝑘 ) = 𝛷 �

𝑎
𝑐𝑘

ln� �
𝜁𝑘

�

(3.6)

where Fk(a) is the probability of exceeding damage state of k, Φ[∙] is the standardized
normal distribution function and c and ζ are the median and standard deviation,
respectively which are estimated using the maximum likelihood function (Shinozuka et
al. 2001). Damage states are descriptions of the level of damage that the bridge
experiences. Four damage states: minor, moderate, extensive and complete have been
considered in this study. The minor damage state corresponds to a situation where the
bridge is fully functional and only minor repairs are needed and each state increases in
severity until the complete damage state where a complete replacement of a span or
bridge has to be conducted. Figure 3.6 shows the envelopes for the fragility curves for
each of these bridges types.
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Link damage states will be set equal to the highest damage state of the bridges on
the link. In this way, the bridges act like a bottleneck for each link. For each damaged
link, the capacity of the road may be reduced based on the damage. For minor damage, it
is assumed that the bridge can still carry its full capacity. For moderate damage, it will be
assumed that the link can still carry 25% of the original capacity. For extensive and
complete damage, it will be assumed that the bridge will be closed for repair so the
bridge will have no remaining capacity.
In areas where a single bridge carries all the traffic between an origin-destination
(O-D) pair, the capacity of the pair is equal to the capacity of the bridge in its damaged
state. If a detour is available, the detour route can carry a portion of the traffic load. To
conduct the analysis the concept of residual capacity can be utilized. Residual capacity
describes the ability for a link to carry a percentage of its normal capacity even when
damaged. For example, there could be a case with high residual capacity where detours
allow for 50% of its original capacity when damaged (Bocchini and Frangopol 2011).
3.1.3. Network Performance Measures
To establish a holistic framework that evaluates the functionality of a transportation
network, it is essential to identify appropriate performance measures that are capable
estimating the state of the network pre- and post-event. Among various measures
proposed to date, three measures of connectivity, flow capacity and travel time are
proven to be the most appropriate ones. The flow capacity can be used to quantify the
extent of damage to the network after an extreme event. This measure represents the
largest possible flow between the origin and destination nodes without exceeding the
capacity of the connecting links (Ahuja et al., 1993). The connectivity analysis
24

determines whether any path remains operational between the given origin and
destination nodes and is mostly suitable for immediate post-disaster emergency response
(Rojahn et al., 1992). It is especially important in situations where a node with very few
links connected to it becomes isolated after a seismic event. Travel time is another
measure that has been widely employed to estimate the level of performance of a
damaged network (Nojima and Sugito, 2000, Stergiou and Kiremidjian, 2010, and Zhou
et al., 2011). The calculation of this measure requires OD data, which can be accessed
from surveys or mathematical models. The travel time can be obtained using static or
dynamic traffic assignment models. To account for the time-dependent nature of travel
time after an extreme event, dynamic traffic assignment models and OD modification
factors are introduced to improve the results obtained from the static models (Shinozuka
et al., 2005, Shiraki et al., 2007, and Kiremidjian et al., 2007).
While these metrics are useful for looking at each aspect of risk analysis
resilience assessment independently, it is useful to have one unit of measure that can be
used on multiple aspects of analyses in this study. Monetary cost measures are applicable
across various aspects of risk and resilience and can be easily calculated from bridge
damage and travel delay. For that reason, the monetary cost will be used in this thesis.
Costs will be broken up into two categories: direct and indirect costs.
Direct costs relate to the actual costs of repair of the bridges in the network. The
direct cost of an individual bridge is proportional to the level of damage the bridge
sustains and the size and complexity of the bridge. Getting a detailed estimate for the cost
of each bridge would be prohibitively complicated as it would depend on the bridge type,
the extent of damage, the availability of local resources among other factors. In this study
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an efficient method that estimates the repair costs of damaged bridges as a function of the
damage state, initial cost and the size of the bridge is used. For each damage state, a
damage ratio is given where the damage ratio is the cost of repair divided by the total
replacement cost. The total expected bridge cost from the sth scenario earthquake can be
expressed as:
𝑅𝑅𝑠 = ∑4𝑘=1 𝑃(𝐷𝐷𝑘 |𝐼𝐼𝑠 ). 𝐶𝑐 . 𝑟𝑘

(3.7)

where RCs is the expected restoration cost of the bridge due to earthquake event s, IMs is
the ground motion at the site of bridge due to sth earthquake event, Cc is the replacement
value of the bridge, rk is the damage ratio corresponding to kth damage state, and P is the
probability of bridge in kth damage state under ground motion IMs. The length and area
of each bridge comes from the NBI database. Based on California Department of
Transportation (2013) data, a value of $160 per square foot is a reasonable estimate for
the replacement value.
The indirect costs associated with delay can be viewed as the product of the delay
(hours), the mean vehicle occupancy, and the value of time for the users (dollars/hour).
The mean vehicle occupancy and value of time can differ based on local demographics
and preferences. The delay is the change in total travel time across the network can be
calculated using the following equation:
𝑁
′ ′ ′
𝑑 = ∑𝑁
𝑖=1[𝑥𝑖 𝑡𝑖 (𝑥𝑖 )] − ∑𝑖=1[𝑥𝑖 𝑡𝑖 (𝑥𝑖 ) ]

(3.8)

where d is the delay, N is the number of links, xi is the flow on link i before the
earthquake, ti(xi) is the travel time of the link as a function of the flow before the
earthquake, and xi’ and ti’ are post-earthquake flow and travel time, respectively.
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After an earthquake, the demand for travel can also change. As a case in point, the
static traffic assignment model used in the Bay area after the 1994 Northridge earthquake
overestimated the travel time ten times larger than the travel time obtained from the local
traffic reports (Werner et al., 2006). There is a cost associated with the opportunities lost
due to the forgone trips. As a lower bound, it can be estimated that the trip would be
worth (at the least) the time it would take to travel to the destination. Similarly, if for
some reason the travel time decreases after an earthquake, the user gains benefit. The
opportunity cost is defined as follows:
𝑝

𝜙 = ∑𝑖 ∑𝑗 �

𝑝

𝑝

′
′
(𝑞𝑖𝑖 −𝑞𝑖𝑖
)(𝑡𝑖𝑖
−𝑡𝑖𝑖 )

2

�

(3.9)

where 𝜙 𝑝 is the opportunity cost, qijp is the number of trips from zone i to zone j before an
earthquake, tij is the travel time between zone i and j before an earthquake and similarly

with qijp’ and tij’ after an earthquake. As with travel delay, this value can be multiplied by
the vehicle occupancy and value of time to get a monetary value. The trip reduction will
follow the model used in Shinozuka et al. (2008) where the reduction in trip demand is
linked to the reduction of usable floor space in the area.
Unlike direct costs which can be estimated based on the state of the network
directly after the earthquake, indirect costs keep piling up day after day until network
performance is restored. Because of this, it is important to be able to estimate the time it
takes for a bridge to be repaired. In this study, a set of continuous repair curves have been
introduced following the HAZUS-MH (2012) strategy. To form these repair curves it is
assumed that repair strategies will start right after the earthquake and will increase
following a cumulative normal distribution function. The parameters of the normal
distribution differ for different damage states indicating the faster repair for minor and
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moderate damage states and more time consuming repair strategies for major and
complete damage states (Figure 3.7). To assign a monetary value to the unit time values
calculated during this procedure, a probability density function for the value of time for
users in the San Francisco Bay area across different income levels proposed by Sall et al.
(2009) will be used. Adjusting the value for 2014 dollars, an expected value of $12 an
hour can be estimated.
The performance measures mentioned here will be utilized in this and following
chapters of this study. This demonstration will show the application of these performance
measures to networks of realistic scale, traffic demand and seismic hazard levels and will
elevate the topic of resilience beyond a conceptual framework and show the concept of
resilience can be used to perform real-world analysis.
3.3. Seismic Risk Analysis
To conduct the seismic risk analyses, the attenuation relationships introduced in section
3.1.2 have been used to estimate level of ground motion intensity measure under each of
the scenario earthquakes at the location of the bridges. Figure 3.8 depicts the damage
states in network bridges from one of the simulations under the 7.5 magnitude earthquake
originated from Site 2 on San Andreas Fault. Considering the high susceptibility of the
San Francisco Bay area to liquefaction, the damage states under PGD are controlling in
most of the cases. Since Liquefaction results in extensive or complete damage states, the
percentage of the failures in these damage states is substantial. Table 3.1 shows the
percentages of bridges in each damage state. Most of the damage occurred in the San
Francisco and San Mateo County, the two locations closest to the epicenter.

Link

damage states will be set equal to the highest damage state of the bridges on the link. The
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earthquake is expected to cause very large disruptions to the transportation network.
Figure 3.9 shows the link damage states directly after the scenario earthquake depicted in
Figure 3.8. As shown, the damage states tend to be higher towards the epicenter of the
earthquake. In this scenario, it is especially problematic since the epicenter in proximity
of the city of San Francisco which will cause significant travel delays.
The disruption causes network users to change their paths, populating different
roads. An example of this shift is seen in Figure 3.10. In this example, the San Mateo
Bridge (shown here as the non-operational bridge in the southern part of the bay) is
closed. Because of that, there is less activity on either end of the bay, resulting in a shift
of demand to other areas. Similarly with the Golden Gate bridge (the non-operational
bridge extending north of the city), the bridges nearby to the Golden Gate Bridge
experience a substantial increase in traffic. Many of the links in blue experience little
change in flow after the earthquake. This is due to fact that the link and surrounding links
either didn’t have bridges or were far enough from the source that the impact was
minimal.
The high potential for structural damage is reflected in large direct damage costs.
Figure 3.11 represents the direct losses associated with the scenario earthquakes of all
magnitudes in Site 2. It’s clear that the direct losses increase with an increase in
magnitude of the ground motion at the same site. Figure 3.12 shows the direct losses due
to the magnitude of 7.5 across the different sites, highlighting the effect of the location of
the source of the ground motion. In this case, the maximum destruction is occurring due
to an earthquake in site 4 while the minimum is caused by an earthquake at site 1. This
indicates the destructive effects of earthquakes that are originated in proximity of the
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highly populated regions. Comparison of the direct losses over the San Andreas fault
shows that they vary based on the location of the rupture and this could be attributed to
the fact that some of them are far away from the densely populated regions. On the other
hand, the site located on Hayward fault is in the heart of a populated region of the
network and as such results in higher losses. For the same magnitudes site 4 on Hayward
fault results in losses comparable to that of site 2, the most damaging of the sites located
on the San Andreas Fault. Though locations further away from the population zones can
also have a strong impact in areas outside the study area.
A study of the simulation results for indirect losses indicates the same trend as
those for direct losses. Figure 3.11 shows these results for a range of magnitudes
generated in site 2 and for a specific magnitude across the different sites, Figure 3.12. For
each of the scenario earthquakes the indirect losses are estimated as a combination of
driver’s delay and opportunity losses. For very large magnitudes of earthquake (i.e
Mw=8.5) there is a diminishing increase in the indirect costs. This may be due to the fact
that the network is approaching a state already where many of the vulnerable bridges are
already damaged. Also, as the ground motion intensity increases, the number of trips
decrease which can offset some of the congestion that would be seen in a more static
demand model.
Seismic risk curves for direct damage and daily indirect damage are shown in
Figure 3.13. This figure helps put the expected annual cost into perspective; while the
very high magnitude earthquakes cause more damage than the lower magnitude
earthquakes (in the billions of dollars), they are less likely than the lower magnitude
earthquakes. The higher magnitude earthquake are represented in the shallow slopes
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closer to the right side of the figure and the lower magnitude earthquakes have more
influence on the left hand side of the figure where the slope is sharper. It is important to
note that since the indirect damage is daily, the cost piles up until the network is repaired.
As the network begins to return to normalcy, the daily indirect costs decrease. To
simulate the effects of repair progress in the indirect costs endured by the network, the
repair curves in Figure 3.7 will be used. For the scenario earthquake generated at site 2
and different magnitudes, Figure 3.14 shows the decrement in the network indirect losses
after the earthquake. As shown, scenarios with higher magnitudes, in addition to having
higher initial indirect costs, also take longer to return to a state with lower costs. The
actual repair time for completely damaged bridges isn’t dependent on the magnitude so
the final bridges regardless of scenario finishes nearly the same time (assuming every
case has a number of bridges in the complete damage state).

Table 3.1: Percentages of bridges in each damage state for one of simulations of the
scenario earthquake
Damage State
Percent of bridges

No damage
71.3

Minor
6
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Moderate Extensive Complete
2.7
5.3
14.7

Figure 3.1: Links and nodes representing the highway network of the study area

Figure 3.2: Location of four epicenters on San Andreas and Hayward faults
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Figure 3.3: Contour of PHA for an earthquake of 7.5 magnitude at Site 2

Figure 3.4: Liquefaction susceptibility map of the San Francisco Bay area
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Figure 3.5: Location and distribution of bridges in the study area
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Figure 3.6: Fragility curve envelopes for the 28 category of bridges
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Figure 3.7: HAZUS-MH restoration curves for highway bridges
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Figure 3.8: A realization of bridge damage states for the scenario earthquake

Figure 3.9: A realization of link damage states for the scenario earthquake

Figure 3.10: A realization of post-event traffic flow for the scenario earthquake
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Figure 3.11: Frequency of direct costs (top) and daily indirect costs (bottom) by moment
magnitude at site 2
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Figure 3.12: Frequency of direct costs (top) and daily indirect costs (bottom) by site
location
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Figure 3.13: Seismic risk curves for the direct (top) and daily indirect costs (bottom)

16

Daily Indirect Cost (million $)

Annual probability of exceedance

0.08

14

M = 6.0
M = 6.5
M = 7.0
M = 7.5
M = 8.0
M = 8.5

12
10
8
6
4
2
0
0

100

200
300
400
Days After the Earthquake

500

600

Figure 3.14: Change in indirect costs over time following a scenario earthquake
at site 2

39

CHAPTER 4
POST-EVENT PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT
4.1. Seismic Resilience Assessment of Highway Networks
A resilient system is more reliable, faces fewer consequences in face of calamities, and
has a faster recovery process. The novelty of the current research is to develop a holistic
framework to quantitatively measure different dimensions of seismic resilience in a large
transportation network. According to Bruneu et al. (2003) for a system to be resilient,
four properties should be provided: robustness, redundancy, resourcefulness, and
rapidity. Robustness is an indicator of the level of performance of the system
immediately after the earthquake. To define robustness of the systems there is a need to
define a suitable system performance metric to evaluate the serviceability of the highway
bridge network. As mentioned in Section 3.1.3., the travel time is used as the
performance metric for this study. The robustness measure, Rυ, for a transportation
network, G, with measure of performance, ε(G,d,c), the vector of demands, d, the vector
of user link functions, c, and the vector of link capacities, u, is defined as the relative
performance retained under a given uniform capacity retention ratio, υ, with υ ∈ (0, 1], so
that the new capacities are given by υu. Its mathematical definition is given as follows:
𝜖𝜐

𝑅 𝜐 (𝐺, 𝑐, 𝑑, 𝑣, 𝑢) = 1 − 𝜖

(4.1)

0

Redundancy is a concept which is closely related to robustness. In that way,

redundancy can be viewed as a way to describe elements of robustness that don’t directly
have to do with the vulnerability of the components of the system. In the extreme, a
system is completely non-redundant when the failure of a component causes the failure of
the entire system (Bertero and Bertero 1999). Redundancy is a complex measure that
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helps quantify the ability of the network to provide alternate routes after a disturbance. In
a redundant network, the network will continue to function, although the level of service
might be affected due to a decreased capacity of the alternate routes. Redundancy is best
defined if aspects of different networks were being compared. Furthermore, redundancy
could be categorized as a topological property of the network rather than a flow-based or
cost-based indicator. However, it should be noted that even the networks that have same
redundancy properties might be different in term of capacity they could handle.
Following the network theory the three following indices will be used to measure the
connectivity of the network: i) alpha index, α, ii) beta index, β, and iii) gamma index, γ.
The alpha index is the ratio of the number of cycles in a network divided by the
maximum number of cycles in the network. A cycle is a sequence of links that originate
and end at the same node without reusing links. Networks with higher alpha values
generally contain more possible paths to take between nodes.
𝑢

𝛼 = 2𝑛−5

, α ∈ (0, 1]

(4.2)

The beta index is equal to the number of links in the network divided by the

number of nodes in the network. Simple networks have values less than one but more
complex networks (such as typical highway networks) should have values greater than
one. Networks where every node is connected but only contains one cycle have a value of
one.
𝑙

𝛽=𝑛

(4.3)
The gamma index measures connectivity by considering the ratio between the

number of links and the maximum possible number of links. If every node was directly
connected to every other node (without passing through an intermediate node,) the
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gamma index would be equal to one. A value of one is unrealistic but offers an
opportunity to compare the current level of connectivity in the network to the theoretical
maximum level.
𝑙

𝛾 = 3(𝑛−2)

, γ ∈ (0, 1]

(4.4)

where n is the number of nodes, l is the number of links (edges), and u is the number of
cycles (l – n +p), and p is the number of sub-networks (Rodrigues 2013). With these
indices, network owners can compare the level of connectivity in their network to other
networks. The indices can also be used in comparing potential additions to the network in
terms of their improvement to the networks connectivity.
In this thesis, the most important aspect of resourcefulness is the ability to
prioritize goals and to provide additional resources towards goals of particular
importance. Specifically, these goals should include the accelerated repair of bridges that
have the most impact on the network. The resourcefulness will be relative to a situation
where there is no prioritization or additional resources allocated; a situation where every
bridge is treated with equal weight and are repaired in the time it would take using
conventional repair techniques.
Rapidity is closely related to resourcefulness. Resourcefulness can lead to an
increase in network performance partway through the repair process. After the bridges
that are being prioritized are repaired, the change in network performance can taper off
meaning that, oftentimes, the rapidity as defined in this paper is best suited for situations
where the performance criteria establishes an acceptable level of performance that may
not necessarily be equal to that of the fully functional state.
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4.2. Robustness and Redundancy
To measure the robustness of the network in terms of direct and indirect costs, the
probability distributions of these factors have been generated. The earthquake is expected
to result in 1.17 billion dollars in direct costs. Figure 4.1 shows the probability
distribution of the direct and indirect costs. Indirect costs were measured against the
initial Vehicle Hours of Travel (VHT). For the purpose of the analyses in this study, the
performance criteria was set such that the indirect costs directly after the earthquake
could not exceed 15% of the initial VHT in the network. The initial VHT was equal to
2.25 million miles per day meaning that an increase of 338,000 hours in cost would cause
the network to fail the performance criteria. The mean indirect cost for the earthquake
was 760,000 hours daily, a large amount above the criteria. None of the simulations show
that, for this scenario, the performance criteria will be met. If a transportation agency had
this performance measure, they should consider strengthening the network by measures
such as adding more links or retrofitting bridges to decrease vulnerability.
Immediately after the earthquake, there is an average drop in vehicle trips by
about 240,000 a day. This drop in trips comes from the expected damage to the floor
space of structures in the TAZ affected by the earthquake. Even after the reduction in
trips, the average trip length increased significantly. Before the event, the average trip
length was equal to about 18.5 minutes. After the earthquake, this value increased to 23.5
minutes, increased by 27.3%. It should be noted that this includes trips whose origins and
destinations didn’t change after the earthquake. Trips with unchanged trip ends (such as
work and school related trips), contributed more to this increase while trips whose ends
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changed after contributed less because these users adapted their trip behavior to suit the
change in network performance.
Local agencies may want to consider adding redundancy in order to decrease the
effects of the earthquake on the network performance. Values for the connectivity indices
that define redundancy are given in Table 4.1. The importance of these indices is more
apparent when compared to other networks. For this purpose, the values of connectivity
indices from three locations: Los Angeles, CA; Reno, NV; and Boston, MA have been
compared to those of the study area. The areas of the networks are clipped such that they
are equal in geographic size to the study area and the network data was taken from the
NHPN. The highway networks for these cities are shown in Figure 4.2. Los Angeles is
similar to San Francisco is some ways; it is a coastal Californian city with high seismic
susceptibility. However, Los Angeles is significantly larger in population and the size of
the urban area. Reno is less populated and dense then San Francisco and has a simpler
highway network. Boston, although located on the opposite side of the country, is similar
to San Francisco in population and land area. The connectivity indices for these cities are
also in Table 4.1.
As shown, the redundancy of the network is not directly correlated with the
complexity of the network. Reno, despite being the simplest network, has similar to
values to the San Francisco network. This is because the nodes on the highway network
in the Reno network tend to have a higher degree. Boston, despite being a similar city to
San Francisco in many respects, has higher connectivity values than San Francisco. This
may be intuitive looking at the maps of the two highway networks where Boston looks
like a more complicated, interconnected network but the index values confirm this
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mathematically. The Los Angeles network is very densely populated throughout the study
area. This plays a part in the need for a complex, deeply connected highway network and
it shows in the high index values. Note that these comparisons are made solely on
highway links. The bay area is very much dependent on a few bridges that connect highly
populated areas. This is one reason why the topology of the network isn’t as strong as
some of the comparisons. In order to increase the redundancy, more bridges would have
to be added across the water. These bridges would be expensive and could be susceptible
to earthquake damage themselves so these costs would have to be balanced against the
benefit of redundancy.
4.3. Repair Strategies
Repair time itself can be taken into account when considering the cost of repairing a
bridge. This is seen in A + B bidding. In this bidding style, bids are awarded to the
contractor who can minimize the cost to repair the bridge, A, and minimize the time to
repair, B. The total cost of the bridge repair can be seen as A + B multiplied by the daily
cost of closure. The competition between contractors to finish early leads to repair times
that are shorter than what would be estimated after other bidding processes. The
NYSDOT, an early adopter of A+B bidding, started using the process in 1994. The
bidding process was to be restricted to critical projects or project phases where traffic
inconvenience and delays must be held to a minimum and should not be used as a
routine. Under normal circumstances, contractors are expected to work about 40 hours a
week. For the projects considered for A+B bidding, the contractor should be allowed to
work 60 hours a week with less restrictions on overtime. The NYSDOT found that
contractors are bidding at 31% below the engineer’s estimated time in A+B contracts. In
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order to make sure that the bridge is repaired in time, incentives and disincentives are
placed that reward contractors for finishing ahead of schedule and fine them for finishing
behind schedule. Over the course of 133 contracts, the NYSDOT found that 114 earned
incentives totaling $57.6 million while securing savings of $305 million in user costs
(NYSDOT 1999). In this paper, the A+B concept will be further extended by considering
the cost of repair and the user costs across an entire network of bridges rather than just
individual construction contracts.
Adding incentives increases the possibility of bridges being repaired ahead of the
schedule. There have been many documented cases where this has been applied to
emergency scenarios. The collision of a barge to bridge pier on I-40 near Webbers Falls,
Oklahoma in 2002 resulted in collapse of one of the bridge spans. This bridge was a
critical component of the local transportation network and it was imperative that the
bridge be restored in a timely manner. For this purpose, the design, demolition and
reconstruction phases were all incentivized. The demolition phase was finished by the
scheduled time. The design phase was finished 4 days ahead of schedule with a bonus of
$5,000 a day. The reconstruction phase was originally expected to take 72 days.
Competitive A+B bidding helped sign a contract with a 57 day schedule. In addition to
these incentives, a $144,000 per day bonus was awarded which lead to the phase
completion in 46 days instead. The entire project was finished in 64 days after the
collapse, a record for a project of this type (Bai et al. 2006). Table 4.2 demonstrates the
details related to different phases of the project and the cost and benefits associated with
incentivizing activities.
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One of the examples of incentivizing the repair phases was after the 1994
Northridge earthquake when many key components of the transportation network were
damaged. For instance, a segment of I-10 was heavily incentivized with an
incentive/disincentive of $200,000 for each day deviated from schedule (approximately
$315,000 in 2014 dollars adjusted for inflation). This project involved the simultaneous
construction of two bridges with work running 24-hours a day, 7 days a week. 228
carpenters and 134 iron workers were assigned to the project which is a large increase
from the 65 and 15 respectively for a normal project. As shown in
Table 4.3 , there is a correlation between the incentives and the time percent
decrease in repair time (US DOT 2002). In addition to incentivizing the repair process,
the recently developed construction techniques could be used to reduce the repair time
over conventional construction techniques. One such technique is the accelerated bridge
construction (ABC). Under ABC, sections of the bridge are constructed and assembled
off-site and then put in place afterwards. This technique has been used extensively in
recent years for the construction of new bridges but it can also be used in emergency
replacement. Benefits of this technique include a much shorter construction time even
with the inclusion of the off-site construction but it can cost more than conventional
construction. It is estimated that the direct cost of ABC is about 30% higher than
conventional construction (California Department of Transportation 2008). Also, not all
bridges are candidates for ABC replacement. In general, simpler bridges are better
candidates for this technique.
Combining incentivizing and ABC has been shown to have impressive results. In
2007, a fuel tanker traveling in Oakland, California tipped over and caused an explosion
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which damaged the I-580/990 connector. Two spans were destroyed. The indirect losses
of this segment were estimated to tally $6 million a day for the busy San Francisco bay
area. Using the ABC techniques and a $200,000 daily incentive resulted in the
completion of the project in only 20 days after the accident (California Department of
Transportation 2008).
Other techniques have been utilized such as modular bridging which can provide
temporary bridges while the original bridge is repaired. The concept from a cost
standpoint is similar; an extra direct cost is incurred but there should be a reduction in the
indirect cost. In this thesis, the application of the A+B and ABC techniques in the
rapidity of repairs after earthquakes will be presented considering a decrease in the mean
repair time of bridges and an increase in the direct cost of the bridges. Because of the
complex interaction between bridges in a network where multiple bridges fail
simultaneously, it would be an over simplification to apply an indirect cost per day to
each bridge and instead the total indirect cost summed across the entire network will be
the focus in this thesis.
4.4. Resourcefulness and Rapidity
To simulate the impact of resourcefulness, three different repair techniques will
be tested: i) conventional repair ii) incentivized repair and iii) accelerated construction
techniques. Considering the importance of the allocation of resources and the repair
strategies, it is required to identify the links that mostly impact the performance metrics
of the system. For this purpose, the concept of the betweenness centrality from network
theory will be used to rank the most important components of the system. The
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betweenness centrality of a link, l, is defined as the number of shortest paths between pair
of nodes that pass through a specific link, given by this equation:
𝐵𝐵𝑙 = ∑𝑖≠𝑗≠𝑙 𝑆𝑃𝑖𝑖 (𝑙)/𝑆𝑃𝑖𝑖

(4.5)

where SP(l) is the number of shortest paths between nodes i and j that pass through l and
SP is the total number of shortest paths. After each link is ranked, the links with the
highest rank will have the additional resources allocated to the bridges on the link. From
there, the next highest link is evaluated and the process is repeated until the additional
resources are dispensed.
The benefit of resourcefulness is shown in Figures 4.3-4.8. Accelerating the repair
of important bridges helps decrease the indirect costs for the users on the network over
the baseline case where no accelerations are committed. In order for the accelerations to
be worth the investment, the decrease in indirect cost should exceed the additional costs
for repair. The decrease in indirect costs is measured as the area between the nonaccelerated curve and the curves for other repair scenarios in Figure 4.3. Each curve has
been averaged from 100 simulations for each scenario. Data is taken in time steps of 50
days. As shown, there is a reduction in indirect costs with the increase in the number of
bridges accelerated and the scenarios with accelerated construction techniques showed an
improvement over scenarios with incentivization alone. In every scenario, there is a large
decrease in daily cost in the 50 to 100 day time step. This is due to the fact that this is
when the majority of the extensively damaged bridges become repaired. In the more
accelerated scenarios, the decrease starts earlier and is more pronounced. This is due to
the repair time of accelerated extensive and complete damaged bridges being completed
during the first 100 days. The scenarios with accelerated construction techniques presents
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an earlier drop than those with incentives only, this is because the accelerated
construction techniques have completed quicker. Eventually, the indirect costs per day
converge as the last few bridges are repaired. At this point, even though there aren’t
many bridges remaining, the impact of the damaged bridges is still substantial.
The indirect costs decrease as the physical state of the bridges improves. Figure
4.4 shows the number of bridges at each damage state throughout the repair process. As
shown, there are a large number of bridges in the more severe damage states that remain
to be repaired even after the less severe bridges are repaired. This is unfortunate as the
higher damage states also affect the network performance more than the lower damage
states because the more damaged bridges carry less (if any) capacity. Also shown are
repair curves with resourceful prioritization for extensive and complete damage state.
Similar curves for minor and moderate damage states are coincident with the nonresourceful curves as these damage states are less likely to be prioritized for repair in this
scenario. Comparing this figure with Figure 4.3, it can be seen that a period of rapid
repair results in a sharp decrease in the indirect costs namely in the 0 to 100 day range.
Also shown in a fairly constant rate of repair between the 100 to 350 day range after
which the repairs taper off.
For rapidity, let the performance measure be the time it would take to return to
95% of the original performance where the loss of performance is the ratio of the delay to
the total VHT. Local agencies will have to be able to set different measures based on the
standards they hold. A more resourceful network may meet rapidity goals sooner as
shown in Figure 4.5. The expected amount of time it would take to meet the performance
measure is less than 200 days for the quickest repair scenario. For comparisons sake,
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without the additional resources, it would take 350 days to meet the criteria. However, if
the performance measure was set to a complete restoration of performance, the
resourcefulness would not significantly contribute to rapidity.
The total cost accumulated piles up quickly early on in the repair stages and tapers
off as the network achieves better performance. Indirect costs accumulate quickly early
on in the repair stages and slows down when more bridges are repaired and stops
accumulating when the network reaches its pre-earthquake state. The indirect costs end
up being the dominant cost after accumulation of all other costs. The additional repair
costs and incentives are small in comparison to the indirect costs. This shows that, if even
a fairly small percentage of the indirect cost is deterred, the additional repair and
incentives will be worth it. As the number of bridges accelerated increases, the indirect
cost decreases and the incentives and additional direct costs increase. Even then, the
indirect cost still dominates and the additional costs are small in comparison.
Figure 4.6 depicts the costs associated with different rapid repair techniques over
time. With incentivization alone, the direct costs are equal early on. After the incentivized
bridges are completely repaired, the baseline scenario and the incentivized scenarios
deviate in favor of the incentivized scenarios showing that the offset of indirect costs
outweigh the incentivization costs. Similar behavior is seen in the ABC with
incentivization with the exception of the increased direct costs early on due to the
increased construction costs associated with the ABC.
Table 4.4 shows the change in total costs using incentivization alone and ABC
with incentivization over the baseline cost. As shown, both techniques offer
improvements over baseline scenario. While there is a continual decrease in the costs as
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more bridge repairs are accelerated, there is a decrease in efficiency. For example, there
is a decrease in cost of over 14% after 10% of the bridges are incentivized. To decrease
the cost by an additional 5%, another 20% of the severely damaged bridges must be
accelerated. This shows the importance of being resourceful enough to at least accelerate
the repair on the most important links. This can include making a list of contractors for
invitational bidding and providing the resources needed for ABC among other means of
preparation. In this study, there is an improvement with each of the acceleration regimes
but it this can be different depending on the study area. These characteristics may include
the costs of the bridges damaged, the redundancy of the network (availability of detours
with similar costs) and the travel behavior and volume of the users on the network.
Next is the comparison between a prioritized and the non-prioritized repair
processes. Figure 4.7 demonstrates this for the 10% incentivized scenario as an example.
In this case, even without targeted prioritization, there is still a benefit from improving
the network. However, the benefit is significantly less than in the prioritized scenario.
The difference between the two prioritization scenarios is about $390 million dollars; a
cost that can be easily avoided by determining the importance of the links before the
seismic event.
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Table 4.1: Connectivity indices for the highway networks of San Francisco, Los
Angeles, Reno and Boston
α
β
γ
N
L

San Francisco
0.269
1.536
0.513
707
1086

Los Angeles
0.373
1.745
0.582
2264
3950

Reno
0.272
1.526
0.523
76
116

Boston
0.303
1.605
0.536
1015
1629

Table 4.2: Oklahoma I-40 Bridge repair acceleration using ABC techniques
Project
Scheduled completion
time
Completion time
Decreased Time (%)
Bonus/day
Total Bonus (est.)
Cost of project (no
bonus)
Bonus / Cost of project

Reconstruction

Demolitio
n

Design

Total

72 days expected, 57
days as bid
46 days
19.3 over bid
$144,000
$1,488,000

16 days

16 days

89-104 days

16 days
0
$50,000
$0

12 days
25%
$5,000
$20,000

64 days
28.1 to 38.4
$1,508,000

$10,900,000

$850,000

$137,000

$11,887,000

13.65%

0.00%

14.60%

12.69%

Table 4.3: Example of bridge repair acceleration after the Northridge earthquake using
incentives
Project
Scheduled completion
time
Completion time
Decreased Time (%)
Bonus/day
Total Bonus (est.)

I-10

SR-14/I-5

I-5 Gavin

SR-118

158 days

207 days

154 days

124 days

84 days
46.8
$200,000
$14,800,000
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172 days
121 days
16.9
21.9
$100,000
$150,000
$3,500,000 $4,950,000

116 days
7.3
$50,000
$400,000

Table 4.4: Improvement over baseline for total costs at the end of the repair process
Repair Strategy
Incentive (5%)
Incentive (10%)
Incentive (30%)
ABC+ Incentive
(5%)
ABC+ Incentive
(10%)
ABC+ Incentive
(30%)

Improvement
Million
Percent
dollars
11.5
393
14.10
481
19.10
652
15.90

542

19.20

655

26.90

917
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100%

100%

90%

Cumulative probability

Cumulative probability

90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%

80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%

0%

0%

0.9

1.3
1.1
Direct cost (billion $)

1.5

0

5
10
15
Daily indirect cost (Million $/day)

20

Figure 4.1: Cumulative probabilities for direct (left) and indirect cost (right)

(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

Figure 4.2: Highway networks for (a) San Francisco, (b) Los Angeles, (c) Reno, and (d)
Boston
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Indirect Costs (million $/day)

12
Incentives only: 5%
Incentives only: 10%
Incentives only: 30%
ABC: 5%
ABC: 10%
ABC: 30%
Normal repair

10
8
6
4
2
0
0

600

200
400
Days after the earthquake

Figure 4.3: Effect of different repair strategies on traffic delay after the earthquake

Bridges in each damage state

350
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Minor
Complete (accelerated)
Extensive (accelerated)

300
250
200
150
100
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0
0

100
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300
400
Days after the earthquake

500

600

Figure 4.4: Number of bridges in each damage state throughout repair
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Network performance (%)

100%

95%

90%
Normal Repair
Incentives only: 5%

85%

Incentives only: 10%
Incentives only: 30%

80%

75%
-100

0

100
200
300
400
Days after the earthquake

500
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Network performance (%)

100%

95%

90%
Normal Repair
ABC: 5%

85%

ABC: 10%
ABC: 30%

80%

75%
-100

0

100
200
300
400
Days after the earthquake

500
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Figure 4.5: Performance curve for network delay with incentivization (top) and with
incentivization and accelerated bridge construction technique (bottom)
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Cumulative cost (billion $)
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2.5
2.0
1.5
Baseline
Incentives (5%)
Incentives (10%)
Incentives (30%)

1.0
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Figure 4.6: Total cost including incentivizing (left) and combination of incentivizing and
ABC technique (right)
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Figure 4.7: Comparison between repair processes with and without prioritization
techniques
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CHAPTER 5
PRE-EVENT DAMAGE MITIGATION
5.1. Introduction
Much of the discussion thus far in the thesis as it pertains to resilience has been focused
on the post-earthquake behavior of network but decision can be made prior to the event to
bolster resilience as well. Retrofitting bridges is an effective way to lessen the initial
impact of earthquakes and thus increases the robustness of the network. In 1971, the San
Fernando earthquake struck the greater Los Angeles area causing extensive damage
throughout the region. The general unpreparedness served as a wakeup call to engineers
which lead to an increased awareness of the importance of proactive measures to reduce
earthquake damage. Since then, seismic design became a crucial part of the bridge design
process. Bridges were designed to be more ductile as to avoid sudden, catastrophic
failure (Rafik and Liao 2003). However, the bridges built prior to 1971 are still key
components of modern highway networks. Also, even when designed with seismic
concerns in mind, bridges deteriorate over time and need to be brought up to par with
seismic demand. It is for this reason that bridges that are vulnerable to seismic hazards
are retrofit. Bridge retrofitting can extend the lifespan of bridges and in many instances
do so in a cost-effective manner. Retrofit costs, while sometimes considerable, are
oftentimes small compared the large-scale repair of a damaged bridge or the cost of a
complete replacement of a bridge that is beyond repair. However, if the bridge is rarely or
never subject to enough seismic demand to damage it, the retrofit is for naught.
After each major earthquake, the awareness of the need for retrofitting and better
seismic design increases dramatically. California, being especially susceptible to
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earthquakes, has been acutely aware of the need for retrofit. Earthquakes serve as a
learning experience as retrofitting methods and seismic design considerations thought to
be adequate before the earthquake are shown to be faulty. Shortly thereafter, new,
hopefully more effective methods are developed based on the data from previous
earthquakes. Methods supported by Caltrans include seat extensions, cable restrainers,
column jacketing, shear keys and additional piles among other methods (Roberts 2005).
Seismic retrofit practices differ across different geographical regions. Different
regions are subject to different levels of seismic hazard and some areas are more affected
by liquefaction and landslides than others. In the central and southeastern United States,
bridges are threatened by earthquakes especially in the New Madrid Seismic Zone. Over
100,000 bridges existing in the states near the New Madrid Seismic Zone many of which
are in danger should a major earthquake strike the area. Many of the bridges were
constructed without seismic concerns in mind which further puts the area at risk to suffer
extreme possible losses. There are five primary retrofit measures employed in the area:
seismic isolation, longitudinal and transverse restrainers, seat extenders, column
strengthening and bent cap strengthening (Wright et al. 2011).
The Pacific Northwest is another part of United States that is highly susceptible to
earthquakes. There have been at least 20 damaging earthquakes in the past 125 years in
Washington including the 6.8 Mw Nisqually earthquake which struck Northeast of the
capital city Olympia, Washington in 2001. Oregon and Washington have made efforts to
ensure the ability to protect bridges against these events. Like California, despite being
in an area of high seismic hazard, there are many bridges still in operation from a time of
more lax seismic design so the need to retrofit bridges is critical. Some retrofitting
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techniques used include restrainer bars and cables, replacement or modification of
vulnerable bearing types and column jackets (steel usually but composite materials have
been used in the past) (Fridley 2007).
5.2. Retrofit Methods
There are a range of retrofit methods that are employed by different agencies. Different
retrofit methods benefit bridge strength in various ways from increasing the flexural
capacity of specific bridge components to preventing the unseating of bridge spans.
Below is an overview of some of the more common retrofit methods.
Seismic isolation increases in the fundamental period of vibration of the bridge
which in turn can reduce the accelerations in the superstructure and decrease the inertia
forces transmitted into the substructure. A consequence of this is that the relative
displacement of the superstructure and the substructure increase but this displacement is
designed to stay within acceptable levels. Isolation bearings are installed that remain stiff
under normal conditions but will dissipate energy under earthquake loadings. Common
types of bearings including elastomeric bearings where a (typically) lead filled bearing is
utilized whose lead core deforms under extreme loading and friction based bearings
where, after a friction coefficient is exceeded, slippage occurs and energy is dissipated by
the friction caused by this slippage (FHWA 2006).
Restrainer cables and bars were among the first type of retrofit strategies used in
California after the 1971 San Fernando earthquake. Restrainer bars and cables serve as a
low cost means to prevent the loss of support between the superstructure and the bearing
seats. Restrainer cables and bars are designed to stay in the elastic range under stress and
usually only carry tension forces (Roberts 1971). Either bars or cables can be used but
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cables are more common for a variety of reasons. Cables are able to be used in shorter
lengths which can often give cables an economic advantage over bars. Cables are also
able to accommodate transverse and vertical movements while bars might require
additional vertical and transverse restraint. While restrainer cables and bars have been
effective in many situations, they have failed in larger earthquakes. This was
demonstrated in recent times during earthquakes such as the 1989 Loma Prieta
earthquake in California and the 1995 Kobe earthquake in Japan. Restrainer cables and
bars are often used in conjunction with other retrofitting methods (Shafieezadeh et al.
2009).
Seat extenders widen bent caps and abutments and help prevent unseating of
bridge spans. Seat extenders are additions of concrete or steel to the sides of bent caps
and abutments that are flush with the top of these components. During an earthquake, this
extra space will allow for more movement of bridge spans without unseating. For bridges
at risk of unseating, seat extenders have been shown to be very cost effective as they are
among the cheapest retrofit to prevent unseating. Catcher blocks are similar to seat
extenders in many ways. These blocks are attached to the top of abutments or bents and
“catch” the girders should the bearings fail. Catcher blocks are used in place of seat
extenders with high bearings. The reason catcher blocks are used is that there may not be
sufficient space in high bearing bridges to attach seat extenders (FHWA 2006).
Column jacketing is another form of retrofitting used often. In reinforced concrete
columns, it is common that, when subject to earthquakes, the vertical reinforcement bows
out reducing the strength of the column and possibly leading to the collapse of the bridge.
This is due to inadequate strength in the hoops in the column. Column jacketing seeks to
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make up for this but enveloping the column in a material that will help prevent the
column from bursting. Jacketing can be made from a variety of materials from steel to
concrete to FRP. Steel is the preferred material by some agencies including Caltrans. In
steel jacketing, two shells are wrapped around the column and welding along the vertical
seam between them. The plates are usually given a small clearance between themselves
and the column of 0.5 to 1 inch and this space is then filled with grout. The plates
themselves are between 0.375 and 1 inch thick. Both circular and rectangular columns
can be retrofitting with jacketing but rectangular columns benefit more from oval or
circular shaped jacket than it would a rectangular one. Jacketing can be used for the entire
height of the column or just a portion. In either case, space is left at the top and bottom of
the column where there is no jacketing as to make sure the jacketing doesn’t provide
strength in the axial direction (FHWA 2006).
The main function of bent caps are to transfer loads from the bearings of the
bridge down to the columns but during an earthquake, the shear strength and flexural
capacity of the caps are tested in ways that aren’t seen under normal service conditions.
For this reason, bent caps are sometimes considered for retrofit. One common way to
retrofit the caps is to add steel rods to increase compressive strength. To do this,
posttensioned rods are added along the outside of the cap running lengthwise or
prestressed rods are added through the bent cap itself. Another retrofit method is to add
steel plates along the top and bottom of the bent cap. These two plates are attached by
steel rods. This serves to brace the bent cap against shear forces. Yet another method is to
encase the entire bent cap in concrete or steel which will increase flexural and shear
strength (Wright et al. 2011).
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Shear keys are useful when trying to prevent excessive movement in the
transverse direction. Shear keys are simply blocks that are placed between girders that
serve to provide lateral restraint in the event that the superstructure sways during an
earthquake. Typically, shear keys are made of reinforced concrete and are attached to the
top of bent cables with dowels. Similar in purpose to shear keys are keeper brackets.
Keeper brackets are steel brackets that are attached to the top of the bent cap and both
side of bridge girders. As with the shear keys, keeper brackets allows a transfer of lateral
force from the superstructure to the substructure (Wright et al 2011).
5.3. Retrofitting Standards
The FHWA’s Seismic Retrofitting Manual for Highway Structures and its predeceasing
documents serve as guidelines for many transportation agencies on how to design bridge
retrofits and how to select bridges for retrofit. Specific types of bridges may have their
own manual as well such as the Seismic Retrofitting Guidelines for Complex Steel Truss
Highway Bridges which itself is largely based on the previously mentioned manual.
These manuals serve as a useful tools to help design bridges and select bridges to retrofit
but, especially on selecting bridges, are simplified and don’t take into account the
complexities that arise when considering entire networks of bridges.
The Seismic Retrofitting Manual for Highway Structures employed a rating
system that assign a number to each bridge based on its likelihood to benefit substantially
from retrofitting and using these ratings, transportation agencies and other bridge owners
can determine the order of the bridges that need to be retrofit. A bridge’s importance is
based on a classification labeled “essential”. As essential bridge is one has one or more of
the following characteristics: the bridge is required for secondary life safety (necessary
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for emergency vehicles or carries an important lifeline such as water for example); the
bridges loss would create major economic impact; the bridge is defined as critical by a
local emergency plan; The bridge is critical to defense and security. The manual then
recommends if the bridge should be retrofit or not based on an acceptable level of
performance the bridge should meet given the importance of the bridge, the lifespan of
the bridge and the hazard level of the bridge site.
The Indices Method can be used to rank bridges by giving them a rank. The
bridges rank, R is the product of a vulnerability rating, V, and the seismic hazard rating,
E. Both V and E rank from 1 through 10 meaning R ranks from 0 through 100. The
vulnerability rating V is the maximum of two other rankings V1 and V2 where V1 is
calculated based on the vulnerability of the connections, bearings and seat widths and V2
is a rating based on the vulnerability of the columns, abutments, and the vulnerability to
liquefaction. A flow chart used to find these values can be found in Figure 5.1.
Another method in the manual is Expected Cost Method. This method is very
much similar to how direct costs were calculated earlier in this study in that the expected
level of damage is found for each bridge and the cost for each bridge will be the level of
damage multiplied by both a repair cost ratio and a total replacement cost. The problem
with the method as presented in the manual is that it is largely incomplete. The manual
mentions that indirect costs should be considered but says that “quantifying these costs is
extremely difficult and cannot be done without considering each bridge in its functional
and societal context. Risk assessment models of complete highway systems are under
development for this and other purposes, and are a promising tool for developing insight
into the complex relationships that govern indirect costs.” Also mentioned is the need to
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consider the redundancy of the bridge in the network but the description is very much
vague and leaves the level of redundancy and the effect of redundancy as a matter of
judgment. The redundancy is largely a matter of availability of local detours but doesn’t
give any quantifiable method to determine redundancy and doesn’t consider many of the
complexities that come up when dealing with larger networks.
The last method mentioned is the Seismic Risk Assessment Method which
involves using fragility functions to perform explicit analysis of highway networks and
considers traffic flow and other considerations. Unfortunately, how exactly to use this
method isn’t explained as it seems more of a class of methods than one particular method
itself. This method would be the most complex and the most complete.
If the benefit of retrofitting could be translated into changes in fragility curves, it
would make the analysis of post-earthquake bridge networks much easier. Fragility
curves, as mentioned earlier simplify bridge characteristics in a way that gives the
probability of failure as a simple function of ground motion and bridge type. However,
the fragility is still based on a more complex analysis bridges that considers the failure of
individual components of the bridge. The benefit of retrofit is also complex as different
retrofit techniques prevent different types of damage to specific bridge components.
Because of this, simplifying the effect of retrofit can be a difficult task. Nonetheless, it
has been attempted by various researchers. Some examples of such attempts are as
follows.
Agrawal et al. (2012) looked at the retrofit of multi-span continuous steel bridges
in New York. This study created a model bridge and compared the damage before and
after a range of ground motion was applied to the bridge. The bridge itself was a three
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span bridge with outer spans of 30m and with the inner span crossing 36m. The bridge
features 6 steel girders supporting a concrete slab. The retrofit schemes tested were
elastomeric bearings, lead-rubber bearings, viscous damping and jacketing with carbon
fiber reinforcement. Elastomeric bearings and lead-rubber bearings were tested
individually and with a range of dampening applied. The effects of these retrofits were
quite significant. The median PGA for each damage state for the retrofit schemes can be
found in Table 5.1. It was also shown that the risk of rupture in the piers after applying
the jacketing was very small showing that this type of retrofit can prevent one of the most
catastrophic modes of failure.
Billah et al. (2012) compared the effects of different jacketing on the fragility of
multicolumn bridge bents. The types of jackets include steel, concrete, engineered
cementitious composite (ECC) and carbon-fiber reinforced polymer. This study used 40
ground motion excitations with 20 being near-fault and 20 being far-field. In this case,
near-fault means that the site-to-source distance is less than 10 miles and far-field is the
opposite of near-fault. Nonlinear time-history analysis was performed on a bridge and the
retrofit schemes were compared. In this study, it was found that ECC and the carbon fiber
reinforced jackets were most effective.
Kim and Shinozuka (2003) used two different example bridge types and subjected
them to a large range of ground accelerations to create fragility curves for bridges retrofit
with steel jacketing. The first bridge was a 3 span bridge with a total length of 34m and
the second bridge was a 5 span bridge with a length of 242m and also had an expansion
join in the middle span. 60 ground accelerations were used based on motions in the Los
Angeles area. In these bridges, it can be seen that jacketing, while less effective in
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preventing lesser damage, can greatly prevent more worrisome damage states. The
number of damaged bridges in this study’s simulations can be found in Table 5.2 and
fragility curves can be found in Figure 5.2.
Fridley and Ma (2007) conducted a report for the Washington Department of
Transportation that looked at the fragility of bridges before and after retrofit. The model
bridge was a “typical Washington bridge” with 120ft spans. As often used in fragility
analysis, peak ground acceleration will be used to describe seismic hazard. A range of
jacketing efforts were looked at including quarter, half and full-height steel jacketing as
well as full-height composite jacketing. As with the other studies, it can be seen that
jacketing can greatly help prevent damage from earthquakes including the more major
damage states. Fragility curve parameters can be found in Table 5.3. This data was also
used to determine which retrofit should be selected by using design PGA and acceptable
probably of failure.
Padgett and DesRoches (2008) present a method to develop fragility curves for
retrofitted bridges. Retrofit methods used in the example include column jackets,
elastomeric bearings, restrainer cables, seat extenders and shear keys. Emphasized in this
methodology is how the state of the bridge is based on multi-component analysis. In the
sample three-span bridge used for the demonstration, the bearings helped at lower
damage states while jacketing and seat extenders helped more in the major damage states.
This shows that the selection of retrofit should be based on the damage state of interest.
5.4. Retrofit Optimization Algorithms
Currently, it is very difficult for decision makers to properly select bridges for retrofit.
Oftentimes, the bridge retrofit selection process considers the bridge by itself rather than
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considering it as a component in a large network. While selecting bridges for retrofit
based on the expected physical damage can be done fairly easily, gauging the greater
impact of the bridge failure is difficult. This is especially true in earthquake situations
where there can be multiple simultaneous bridge failures. Because of this, the actual
selection of which bridges in a network are retrofit aren’t made in the most effective and
efficient manner.
It would be of great benefit if there was an optimization scheme that minimizes
losses from earthquakes without overspending on retrofits. There are numerous types of
optimization algorithms that can be applied but the difficulty of implementation but the
accuracy and the computational intensiveness of the algorithms make actually utilizing
some these algorithms difficult. In this section, different types of optimization methods
that have been used in retrofit selection problems will be detailed and a novel
optimization method will be introduced that will provide an effective retrofit scheme that
runs with reasonable computational resources.
The three existing optimization methods detailed will include genetic algorithms, neural
networks and two-stage stochastic optimization.
5.4.1. Genetic Algorithms
Genetic algorithms mimic natural selection to find an optimal solution to a given
problem. In a genetic algorithm, potential solutions are defined with a genome. In the
biological sciences, a genome is the set of DNA for an organism and the DNA defines
what an organism is. The algorithms genome behaves in a similar way. In the retrofit
problem, the genome may be a binary list which bridges are retrofit with which types of
bridge retrofit. Genetic algorithms have been used in problems that bear similarities to the
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goals in this thesis. Dong et al (2014) used genetic algorithms to find a set of paretooptimal solutions that minimize retrofit cost and societal cost with particular focus on
sustainability including CO2 emissions. Elhadidy et al. (2013) created a visual basic
program that utilizes a genetic algorithm to find the pareto-optimal solution set that helps
decision makers decide if and when pavement should be rehabilitated in a network by
minimizing maintenance cost and maximizing pavement condition. Bocchini and
Frangopol (2012) used genetic algorithms to determine the optimal set of solutions for
interventions on bridges on a highway segment where the objective is to minimize cost as
well as increase resilience where resilience is based on the travel time in the network.
In nature, random mutations can change a genome for a particular organism. This
mutation may affect how well the organism thrives in its environment. The organism may
be more or less likely to thrive or the mutation may have no noticeable effect at all. If the
organism is more likely to thrive, it will be more likely to pass on this mutation and its
offspring will carry the benefits. If the mutation is not beneficial, the opposite is true. The
genetic algorithm works much in the same way. Mutations are applied to the genome in a
way that change the values in the genome. .With these new values will thus change the
objective function. If the new genome improves the objective function, it will be more
likely to produce offspring that may have mutations of their own. Through this process,
the algorithm generally improves over time and the algorithm is stopped when
convergence is found.
Genetic algorithms do carry significant drawbacks however. For one, the
algorithm doesn’t promise to find the globally optimal solution. Due to its nature as a
stochastic search algorithm, it is prone to getting “stuck” at local maxima and minima.
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This can be remedied sometimes with starting the algorithm with different starting
genomes but this is at the expense of computational resources and still doesn’t guarantee
the optimal solution. Also, genetic algorithms often take a long time to converge. This
last point in particular is the reason why this class of algorithms will not be used in this
study. Each evaluation of the objective function comes with computationally intensive
processes such as calculating user equilibrium in a network so if the genetic algorithm
requires a very large amount of evaluations of the objective, the computationally
requirements will be extremely high.
5.4.2. Artificial neural networks
Artificial neural networks can be used to approximate solutions to optimization problems
by mimicking how the human brain learns. Neural networks are machine learning models
that, when given a set of inputs and outputs, try to establish a pattern that will allow for
the model to create an approximate function that explains what effects the inputs have on
the output. For example, a manufacturer may produce a product and may be curious as to
which markets to expand to next. The manufacturer could use the input demographic data
from their available markets as well as their sales in each of these markets. The model
will then use this data to estimate how aspects such as total population, education and
income effects sales of the product. From this, an approximate function that links the
demographics and sales are created. Then, the demographics of possible markets are
input into this function to estimate sales.
The most useful aspect of neural networks is the fact that it can approximate
functions without needing to know the underlying behavior of the problem. In the
previous example, the model doesn’t actually need to know why income affects sales. It
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just determines if it does and how much. This type of model is considered a “black box”
model where the input and outputs are known but the actual mechanisms in between are
unknown. This would be useful in retrofit selection. If possible, a neural network would
weigh bridges based on the impact it has after retrofitting without needing to involve
complexities such as its probability of failure, its importance in the network, its capacity
and so on.
Neural networks have previously been used in problems related to seismic
damage. Jafarzadeh et al (2013) used neural networks to predict retrofit construction
costs of buildings by using predictors such as structure types and using the retrofit net
construction costs as the output. Gonzalez-Perez and Valdes-Gonzalez (2011) used neural
networks to predict to structural damage to a vehicular bridge by using data populated
from 12,801 damage scenarios developed using a finite element model. Arangio (2013)
uses readings from accelerometers across a cable stayed bridge as well as 19 years of
damage data to train a neural network model to help identify possible damage.
Neural networks were tested utilizing our previously mentioned cost metrics on
small test networks. For the test networks, a number of simulations were run where
earthquake affected the network, damaging bridges in the network. Bridges were retrofit
at random and the bridges that were retrofit were more likely to survive the earthquake.
From there, the direct and indirect costs were calculated for each simulation. The retrofit
schemes and sum costs were used as inputs and outputs respectively into the neural
network toolbox within MATLAB. Unfortunately, even for small networks, the model
had a difficult time determining the weight of the bridges in the network. This is due to
the large amount of randomness in the network. For example, it would be entirely
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possible for a bridge to survive an earthquake even when not retrofitted in one simulation
but then fail in another simulation where the bridge is retrofit. In this case, the neural
network may interpret this retrofit as negatively impacting the direct and indirect costs
which is not the case. In order to eliminate these situations, many simulations need to be
run in order to give the model a decent amount of data to learn from. The number of
simulations needed for these test networks to produce a reasonable approximate function
is quite high and for larger networks, it would take magnitudes more simulations to
produce a function. For this reason, neural networks and other black box methods weren’t
used in this thesis.
5.4.3. Two-Stage Stochastic Model
The last method of optimization considered was the two-stage stochastic model. The
premise behind a two-stage stochastic model is the decisions should be made using
available data without knowing for certain future events. Usually this involves knowing a
probabilistic distribution of possible events and finding a solution that minimizes some
costs based on that probability. In the case of earthquakes, it is unknown if an earthquake
will strike in a given time frame and it’s just as difficult to predict its severity. Even then,
it’s impossible to say for certain which bridges will be damaged for a specific earthquake.
However, it can be said how likely it is for an earthquake to happen as well as how likely
it is for a bridge to fail after an earthquake. Using this information, we can try utilize the
expected cost in a minimization function to help best choose a retrofit scheme that will
give the greatest benefit. The two-stage stochastic model does just that by incorporating
the expected cost and the cost of implementing decision variables (in this case the
decision to retrofit) into an objective function in a minimization problem.
73

The basic formulation of a two-stage stochastic problem is as follows:
min𝑥 𝑐 𝑇 𝑥 + 𝐸[𝑄(𝑥, 𝜉)]

(5.1)

where cT is the cost vector for implementing first stage decision variable x and E[Q(x,ξ)]
represents the expected cost of the second-stage problem where Q(x,ξ) is the solution to
the second-stage problem and ξ is a set of random properties. In this particular
formulation, the cost associated with decision variable x is written as a linear function but
it doesn’t necessary have to be formulated in this way. The second-stage problem is
solved after the random properties have been realized. The second stage problem is:
min𝑦 𝑞(𝑦, 𝜉)

(5.2)
s.t.

𝑇(𝜉)𝑥 + 𝑊(𝜉)𝑦 = ℎ(𝜉)

where y is a vector of the second stage variables, T(ξ), W(ξ) and h(ξ) are functions
forming the constraints of the second stage problem which are themselves based on the
realization of the random parameters.
Oftentimes, functions of ξ are unobtainable or at least difficult to implement. It
would be useful to be able to use an approach that discretizes the expected value of the
second stage as a means to reasonable estimate the expected costs of the stage. The
expected cost term can be rewritten as follows:
𝐸[𝑄(𝑥, 𝜉)] = ∑𝐾
𝑘=1 𝑝𝑘 𝑄(𝑥, 𝜉𝑘 )

(5.3)

where K is a number of scenarios representing the full distribution of possible scenarios,
pk is the probability of scenario k occurring and ξk represents the random parameters
associated with scenario k. If a sufficiently large number of simulations are run, the
simulations can reasonable estimate the expected cost term. In this study, K will represent
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the number of earthquake simulations run, pk will represent the probability that the
earthquake will occur and ξk will contain random parameters such as bridge failures.
The two-stage problem lends itself very well to the retrofit problem. The first
stage problem is where bridges are decided to be retrofit. The x becomes a binary vector
that gives information on whether or not a bridge is retrofit (with 1 being retrofit and 0
being non-retrofit). This can be further extended if need to be considered for different
types of retrofit fairly easily by having x as a vector of size 1 by [number of
bridges×types of retrofit] and having the binary variables represent if a particular type of
retrofit is conducted on a particular bridge. The second stage will contain variables
pertaining to how the drivers behave after the earthquake. Variables will include flow
rates for each link and have constraints related to the traffic demand after the earthquake.
Some work has been conducted so far on application of two-stage stochastic
algorithms for finding the optimal. Liu et al. (2009) utilized a two-stage stochastic model
to retrofit bridges in models for the Sioux Falls network as well as an Alameda County
network. The study uses Benders decomposition, a well-known method of solving
stochastic programming problems, to solve for an optimal retrofit scheme. This study
shows that the method can be effective but it still showed some potential issues related to
high-computational resources, simplifications to the failure process (retrofit bridges are
assumed to never fail) and, since the networks were fairly small, questions about the
scalability of the model. Fan and Liu (2010) expanded on the previous work by using a
method progressive hedging instead of Benders decomposition as well as using a
discretized model.
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The two-stage model fits the problem quite well and if the difficulties regarding
the computational intensiveness of the model can be solved, it would be better than many
of the other families of optimization methods. Because of this, the two-stage model will
be the method utilized in this thesis. In order to overcome the shortcomings of the model,
some simplifications will be made in order to solve the problem quickly for fairly largescale problems.
The formulation of the two-stage problem utilized in this study will be as follows
starting with the first stage:
min𝑥 𝑐𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 𝑟 + ∑𝐾
𝑘=1 𝑝𝑘 𝑄(𝑟, 𝜉𝑘 )
s.t.

(5.4)
𝑟 ∈ {0,1}

where the second stage problem takes the form:
𝑥𝑘

𝑄(𝑟, 𝜉𝑘 ) ∶= min𝑥 𝑐𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 (𝑟, 𝜉𝑘 ) + 𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∑𝑎 ∫0 𝑎 𝑡𝑎𝑘 (𝑥𝑎𝑘 , 𝜉𝑘 )0
(5.5)

s.t.

𝑥𝑘

4

𝑡𝑎𝑘 = 𝑡0,𝑎 �1 + 0.15 � 𝑎𝑘 � �
𝑐
𝑎

𝑘
𝑘
= 𝑞𝑖𝑖
� 𝑓𝑃,𝑖𝑖
𝑃

𝑖𝑖

𝑘
𝑥𝑎𝑘 = � � �(𝛿𝑎,𝑃 ∗ 𝑓𝑃,𝑖𝑖
)
𝑖

𝑗

𝑃

𝑘
𝑥𝑎𝑘 ≥ 0 ; 𝑓𝑃,𝑖𝑖
≥0

where cretrofit is a vector represents the retrofit cost for each bridge, r is a binary vector
representing the decision to retrofit a bridge, crepair(r, ξk) represents the total repair costs
under scenario k, cindirect converts travel time into indirect costs by methods mention
earlier in the paper, tak (xak, ξk) is the travel time of link a under simulation k as a function
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𝑖𝑖

of link flow 𝑥𝑎𝑘 , t0,a represents the free flow travel time of link a, 𝛿𝑎,𝑃 is 1 if the link

𝑘
between i and k is in path P and 0 otherwise, 𝑐𝑎𝑘 is the capacity of link a, 𝑓𝑃,𝑖𝑖
is the flow

on path P between nodes i and j and qijk is the trip rate between i and j. The constraint in

the first stage establishes r as a binary vector. The objective function in the second stage
establishes the repair cost for the simulation in the first term and sets the condition for
user equilibrium in the second term. The first constraint is the BPR function as described
in the traffic demand modeling section of the paper. Note that the capacity can change
from simulation to simulation as the capacity is a dependent on the states of the bridges
on that link. The next constraint makes sure that travel demand is met by having the sum
of all flow on the used paths between i and j be equal to the demand between the nodes.
Note that the demand will be calculated using the gravity model described earlier. The
third constraint in the second stage connects the concepts of link flow and path flow. The
final constraint prevents negative path and link flow.
From here, the user can use a solver capable of solving the problem. There are
multiple commercial solvers that can be utilized such as AMPL and the MATLAB
optimization toolbox. The software packages often include a variety of algorithms such
as interior point algorithms and active set algorithms. Most of the algorithms follow the
some overarching idea: the algorithm starts at a guess for the solution and the algorithm
iterates towards a better solution until some sort of convergence criteria is met. These
general algorithms can work well on smaller networks but as the network scales, the
algorithms cannot be expected to solve the problem in a reasonable amount of time.
When the bridges number in the thousands, there are at least an equal number of first
stage decision variables. When a network has thousands of links and hundreds of
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simulations, there are hundreds of thousands of values for link flow that must be solved.
The problem has to be simplified or a strong guess for the initial solution must be
obtained.
After the algorithm is complete, it can either be used as is for an approximation
for the solution to the two-stage stochastic problem or as a warm start to a more general
solver. This being a greedy algorithm (As it makes decisions based on the locally
optimum choice at each iteration), the program may stop closer to a local minimum
which may not necessarily be the same as a global minimum. For this reason, this
algorithm is best suited for situations where the network that is large enough to require a
simplified method of evaluation and networks with different solution sets that are similar
in their optimality.
5.5. Retrofit Optimization Study Area
To demonstrate the retrofit selection algorithm, a cutout of the larger San Francisco Bay
area network will be used. This cutout will include the Oakland area, one of the busier
areas in the whole network and extends eastwards towards the bounds of the previous
case study. A map of the cutout region can be seen in Figure 5.3. This area will include
1017 bridges and 817 nodes. This scale will allow for a more compact demonstration of
the algorithm while still utilizing a sizable network. The algorithm itself can be applied to
networks larger or smaller than the Oakland area however.
Some simplifications and alterations will be utilized for the retrofit selection
demonstration. Since most of the retrofits discussed previously aren’t used in liquefaction
scenarios and the Bay area happens to be an area of very high liquefaction susceptibility,
the chance of liquefaction will not be incorporated into the demonstration. Also, the
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initial hazard levels and driver demand were set to values such that the effects of
retrofitting can be easily visualized and may be different then the values used in the risk
analysis section.
A retrofit technique that mirrors the qualities of steel jacketing will be selected for
this demonstration. The change in fragility will be adapted from the results found in from
Kim and Shinozuka (2003) which was mentioned in the previous section. This bridge
type is similar to many types of bridges that might be seen in the area. A retrofit cost of
$12000 per column will be used as a starting point. The number of columns will be
estimated using NBI statistics and it will be assumed that every bridge could be a
candidate for retrofit. As with the previous study, all bridges are considered to be in the
pre-retrofit state to begin with. It will be assumed that there is enough resources to retrofit
up to 600 of the bridges.
Retrofit selection at any iteration will be based on the expected detour and the
expected repair cost of each bridge. The detour will be the shortest path from one end of
the link with the bridge on it to the other if the bridge is closed or the capacity is reduced.
The detour is generally longer in length than the original link and may be congested in
the post-earthquake state. The expected time is then calculated based on likelihood of
failure and the length of the detour after failure. This is multiplied by the number of users
effected by the detour and is converted to a dollar value. This is then added to the
expected repair cost and the bridges are then ranked by this value and selected for retrofit
accordingly. At any iteration, the state of the network changes and the detours must be
recalculated in order to reflect this change.
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It is important to know how the retrofit selection process changes with the
characteristics of the network and the characteristics of the retrofit technique itself. A
network stakeholder might want to know if more or less bridges should be retrofit if the
cost of retrofitting increase for instance. Because of this, the sensitivity of the retrofit
selection to risk, cost of retrofit, and effectiveness of retrofit will be analyzed.
Multiple risk scenarios will be tested in order to show the sensitivity the retrofit
selection process has to the hazard level. In the initial scenario, seismic hazard will be
based off the probability of the earthquake scenarios on the Hayward fault site in the San
Francisco case over a period of 50 years. Scenarios of lesser and higher risk will be tested
as well. In a lesser risk scenario, this chance will be halved while in a higher risk
scenario, the hazard will be increased by fifty percent. To show the sensitivity to cost,
three levels of retrofit costs will be used. In the initial scenario, the costs mentioned
previously will be used. In a cheaper scenario, this will be halved while in a more
expensive scenario this will be doubled. Lastly, the effectiveness of retrofit strategies on
the selection of number bridges for retrofit will be explored. Three scenarios will be used:
the first scenario is a baseline scenario that behaves as one might expect from a steel
jacketed retrofit, the second scenario will represent half the benefit (which will mean the
change in the mean of the fragility curve will be halved), and the third scenario will
assume that bridges that are retrofit do not fail. Some studies have selected bridges based
on this assumption and it would be important to see if that assumption is reasonable.
5.6. Discussion of Results
The retrofit selection algorithm was applied to the Oakland network and from there, the
information was used to determine which bridge to retrofit and how different parameters
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including seismic risk, retrofit cost and retrofit effectiveness can affect the selection.
Figure 5.4 and Table 5.4 displays the change in costs as more and more bridges are
retrofit. Costs are broken down into those associated with drivers’ delay, retrofit and
repair with the total cost being the sum of the three. Initially, no bridges are retrofit this
leaves a state with no retrofit costs but higher delay and repair costs. The first bridges
selected are based on the expected repair costs. As shown, the drop in repair costs
outpaces the increase in retrofit cost at first. Shortly after 50 bridges, the change in repair
costs and retrofit costs even out and then retrofit selection incorporates delay more in the
selection process. At around 151 bridges, the cost starts increase slightly then begins to
plateau. This makes the retrofit state at 151 a good choice for a retrofit scheme. Figure
5.5 shows the bridges that were selected for retrofit at the optimal stage (=150 bridges).
Important factors include the distance from the site to the fault, the type of bridge, detour
length and driver demand for the bridges. The general trend toward repairing bridges
closer to the fault and those closest to the city of Oakland itself can be seen but
incorporating these other factors requires detailed analysis as they may not be readily
apparent from looking at the figure.
Figure 5.6 and Table 5.5 display the results for the total costs the network
experiences under different risk scenarios. As expected, the initial cost without retrofit is
proportional to the likelihood of the earthquake scenarios. In the lower risk scenario,
fewer bridges are retrofit and less benefit can be seen for retrofitting these bridges
optimally. This intuitively makes sense as if the network is unlikely to experience any
earthquakes, only the few most important bridges will be retrofit even those only provide
so much benefit when compared to the cost. The opposite is true in the higher risk
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scenarios. The greater the risk, the more bridges selected for retrofit and the greater
benefit they provide. In the higher risk scenario, the choice of retrofit is bounded by the
limitation on the maximum possible retrofits though the benefits from retrofitting 600
against retrofitting a sizably lower amount isn’t that large as the benefits begin to slow
down greatly near the 200 bridge mark. This shows how important it is to understand the
hazard level of the surrounding area when considering seismic retrofits.
The sensitivity to the cost of retrofit can be seen in Figure 5.7 and Table 5.6. The
benefit and disadvantages of cheap and expensive retrofits respectively are made clear.
With cheaper retrofits comes greater feasibility in retrofitting bridges. If the retrofit cost
is halved, the number of bridges before the benefits plateau is slightly higher and the
reduction in cost increases significantly. This shows the importance of developing cheap,
effective retrofit techniques as the benefit can be quite large. The inverse is the case for
expensive retrofits. The benefits of retrofitting begin to become a burden on the network
quickly and thusly, not many bridges can be retrofit efficiently. This may be an issue in
areas that do not have access to affordable retrofit techniques. One important factor to
note is that during the first few retrofits, the curves for all scenarios are very close. This is
because for especially important bridges that undergoes retrofit (which are retrofit first),
the benefits far outweigh the costs even if the retrofit comes at a premium. This shows
that for important bridges, expensive retrofits can still be well worth the price.
The last sensitivity parameter looked at is the change in retrofit selection with a
change in retrofit effectiveness. Even after retrofitting, there’s still a chance of failure.
Similar to how more expensive retrofits limit the feasibility of retrofitting so does
decreasing its effectiveness. The retrofit with halved effectiveness sees a significant
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decrease in benefit as does the expensive retrofits but the less effective retrofits also carry
the disadvantage of requiring a larger number of bridges retrofit to achieve this already
unimpressive benefit. This means additional resources such as man-hours used on a
retrofit that doesn’t perform up to par. The no-fail retrofits show a sizeable increase in the
benefit received when retrofit. However, the number of bridges that are retrofit before
plateauing did not increase all too much. This means that, at least in this network, the
improved retrofits does more to increase the benefit of bridges that would be selected
anyway rather than make retrofits more feasible on other bridges. This also shows
however that the assumption used in some models that the post-retrofit failure can be
ignored can lead to an overestimate on the benefit of retrofitting. The effect of the
optimal retrofit scheme on the resilience curve of the network can be seen in Figure 5.9
for a 7.5 magnitude earthquake located near the city. As shown, the impact of retrofitting
can be seen in the initial drop after the earthquake strikes. This furthers the idea that
retrofitting increases what we labeled as the robustness of the network. This makes sense
as the robustness is dependent on the fragility of the network elements before the event
and retrofitting will make these elements less fragile. This also highlights the notion that
robustness is based on pre-earthquake decisions. The retrofit curve shows a reduction in
performance loss of 34% over the non-retrofit state.
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Table 5.1: Median PGA for MSC bridges before and after retrofitting
Damage State
Original Bridge
Elastomeric bearings
Lead-rubber bearings
Elastomeric bearings +
dampening

Minor
Moderate Extensive Complete
0.6
0.66
1.07
1.19
0.74
0.89
>1.20
>1.20
0.68
0.84
>1.20
>1.20
0.80-0.93 0.95-1.10
>1.20
>1.20

Table 5.2: Number of bridges damaged before and after column jacketing (Kim
and Shinozuka, 2003)
Bridge 1
Bridge 2
Before
After
Before
After
Retrofit Retrofit Retrofit Retrofit
56
53
51
50
51
44
47
41
41
28
37
22
34
15
30
10
17
2
14
4

Damage State
No Damage
Minor
Moderate
Extensive
Complete

Table 1.3: Fragility curve parameters for the retrofitted bridges (Fridley and Ma
2007)

No Retrofit
Steel Jacket
Half-Height Steel
Full-Height Steel
Full-Height
Composite

c
ξ
c
ξ
c
ξ
c
ξ
c
ξ

Minor
0.45
0.84
0.75
0.84
1.8
0.21
1.43
0.2
1.05
0.21
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Moderate Extensive Complete
0.8
1.04
1.66
0.84
0.84
0.84
1.25
1.73
5.5
0.84
0.84
0.84
1.72
1.49
1.39
0.18
0.16
0.15
1.28
1.16
1.09
0.2
0.18
0.17
0.96
0.89
0.84
0.17
0.15
0.14

Table 5.4: Drivers’ delay, retrofit, repair and total costs for retrofitting the Oakland
network under initial conditions (million $)

Bridges
Retrofit

Delay
Cost

Retrofit
Cost

Repair
Cost

Total
Cost

0
100
200
300
400
500
600

276
264
253
243
230
212
212

0
18.5
35.0
48.5
62.8
79.1
95.3

151
85
77
76
74
71
68

427
368
366
368
367
362
375

Table 5.5: Bridge retrofit cost reduction for varying risk scenarios

Risk Scenario
Lower Risk
Initial Risk
Higher Risk

Bridges Retrofit

Cost Reduction (Million $)

83
151
600

26
67
133

Table 5.6: Optimal bridge retrofit for varying cost per retrofit
Retrofit Cost
Half cost
Initial Cost
Double Cost

Bridges Retrofit

Cost Reduction (Million $)

247
151
600

115
67
308

Table 5.7: Optimal bridge retrofit for varying retrofit effectiveness
Effectiveness

Bridges Retrofit

Cost Reduction (Million $)

Lower effectiveness
Initial effectiveness
No failure possible

103
151
600

35
67
130
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Are bearing details satisfactory?

Yes

No
Check transverse behavior:
No

No
Restraint fails?
Yes
2- or 3-girder bridge with outside girder

Yes

No
No

Pedestals?
Yes
Rocker Bearings?

No

Yes
No

Overturning of bearings possible?
Yes
Bridge collapse likely?
Yes
No

Vt = 0

Vt = 5

A

Vt = 10

B

Figure 5.1: Flow chart for the values of V1 and V2 (recreated from Seismic Retrofitting Manual)
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A

B

Check longitudinal behavior:
Yes

N<L

No

N/2 < L < N

.

Yes
No

Rocker bearings?
Yes
Yes

Overturning of bearings possible?
No
VL = 0

VL = 5

VL = 10

V1 = Maximum of VT, VL

V1 = 0

Figure 5.1 (Contd.): Flow chart for the values of V1 and V2
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(a)

(b)
1.0

0.9

Unretrofitted
Steel Jacket

0.8

Probability of exceedance

Probability of exceedance

1.0

0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1

0.9

Unretrofitted
Steel Jacket

0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1

0.0

0.0
0.0

0.2

0.4
0.6
PGA (g)

0.8

1.0

0.0

0.2

0.4
0.6
PGA (g)

(c)

1.0

(d)

1.0

1.0

0.9

Unretrofitted
Steel Jacket

0.8

Probability of exceedance

Probability of exceedance

0.8

0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1

0.9

Unretrofitted
Steel Jacket

0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1

0.0

0.0
0.0

0.2

0.4
0.6
PGA (g)

0.8

1.0

0.0

0.2

0.4
0.6
PGA (g)

0.8

1.0

Figure 5.2: Fragility curves for the bridge with steel jacketing (Kim and Shinozuka,
2003)

Figure 5.3: Highway network of the test bed (Oakland) for the damage mitigation
strategies
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450
400

Cost (Million $)

350
300
250
Total Cost
Delay Cost
Repair Cost
Retrofit Cost

200
150
100
50
0
0

200
400
Bridges retrofit

600

Figure 5.4: Delay, retrofit, repair and total costs for retrofitting the Oakland
network under initial conditions

Figure 5.5: Bridges selected for retrofit in the initial scenario
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700

Higher Risk
Initial Risk
Lower Risk

Total Cost (Million $)

600
500
400
300
200
100
0
0

200
400
Bridges retrofit

600

Figure 5.6: Total costs for retrofitting the Oakland network for varying risk scenarios

500
450

Total Cost (Million $)

400
350
300
Double Cost
Initial Cost
Half cost

250
200
150
100
50
0
0

100

300
400
200
Bridges Retrofit

500

600

Figure 5.7: Total costs for retrofitting the Oakland network for varying cost per retrofit
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500
450

Total Cost (Million $)

400
350
300
250
Lower
effectiveness
Initial effectiveness

200
150
100
50
0
0

100

200
300
400
Bridges Retrofit

500

600

Figure 5.8: Total costs for retrofitting the Oakland network for varying retrofit
effectiveness

Network Performance (%)

100%

95%

90%
Retrofit
Non-Retrofit

85%

80%
-100

100
300
Days after the earthquake

500

Figure 5.9: Network performance with and without retrofit for a 7.5 Mw earthquake near
Oakland
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSIONS
A large earthquake near a vulnerable or highly populated area can cause enormous losses
to the critical civil infrastructure systems including the transportation infrastructure.
Damage to transportation infrastructure carries costs both in terms of repair costs and in
decreased performance during the repair period. The goal of this study is to generate
comprehensive resilience quantification framework that will provide the decision makers
with the required tools to determine the vulnerability of highway network in face of
calamities, plan for possible disruptions, and prepare for possible consequences with the
final goal of decreasing the downtime in the functionality of the system.
Transportation networks are particularly important infrastructure networks to
consider. There have been numerous historical events such as the 1989 Loma Prieta
earthquake and the 1994 Northridge earthquake that caused great damage throughout the
local transportation systems. For these and other instances, very large costs have been
seen as network owners scramble to repair damaged bridges all the while network users
see huge delays in their day-to-day lives which makes it difficult for society to functional
normally. In order to prevent or limit the impacts from earthquakes on transportation
networks, a deep understanding of the expected level of damage, the network recovery
process and effect of additional precautions to help strengthen the network must be
achieved.
This thesis sets out to provide methods to better describe how transportation
networks respond to an earthquake by studying the resilience of the network. A resilient
network should be able to recover quickly and limit the impact due to earthquakes.
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However there is an ongoing discussion between researchers, community leaders, and
authority bodies on quantifying the resilience of a system. This thesis gives a detailed
methodology that can be utilized by network owners to determine how well the
individual bridges perform after an earthquake, what level of physical damage can be
observed throughout the network, what level of indirect damage (including driver delay)
can be expected, how providing additional resources to the repair process can help the
network recover quickly and how to select pre-event actions in order to limit damage
most effectively.
Resilience is a topic of growing concern in recent time. From its beginnings in the
scientific literature as a descriptor of ecological behavior, it has expanded until fields
including engineering and economics. Concern grew in the last decade due to disasters
including hurricane Katrina and the 2008 economic crash and the importance of studying
and measuring resilience has been recognized by those ranking up to the highest offices
in the United States. Even with acceptance of the importance of the topic, works that can
be applied to real world situations are fairly sparse and this thesis sets to create a
framework for resilience that has tangible benefits to society.
This study follows an overarching definition of resilience set forth by Bruneau et
al. (2003). In that study, resilience is seen as the sum of four characteristics called the
four “R’s” of resilience and four dimensions called TOSE. The four R’s include
robustness, redundancy, resourcefulness and rapidity. Robustness describes how well the
system can absorb the impact of an event, redundancy describes how well the system can
provide alternatives when needed, resourcefulness measures how well systems prioritize
goals and provides resources to accomplish them and rapidity describes how quickly the
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system is restored. The four dimensions include technical, organizational, social and
economic aspects (TOSE). Technical dimensions describe how well physical system
stand up to disasters, organizational dimension refers to how well governmental and other
deciding bodies respond to disaster, social dimension measures how well the system
limits social losses and economic resilience describes how well a system limits economic
losses.
A concept closely related to resilience is risk analysis, which helps determine
probabilistically the level of damage expected in the system. In the study of earthquakes,
it would be useful to know how often earthquakes occur, the severity of the earthquake
and how susceptible the transportation infrastructure is to the earthquakes. The likelihood
and severity of the earthquake can be considered its level of hazard and the susceptibility
can be considered as the vulnerability of the community. Risk itself is seen as the product
of hazard and vulnerability. Knowing the risk of a community informs the community
leaders the extent of preparation needed for earthquakes and helps determine mostly
affected parts of the community. A framework for the risk assessment of the
transportation network in a seismic prone region has been provided. As a demonstration,
a model of the San Francisco bay area has been presented. As a location of high seismic
activity, dense population and high liquefaction susceptibility, it is a prime example of an
area which benefits from seismic risk analysis. The seismic risk originated from both San
Andreas and Hayward faults has been taken into account. There are three scenarios of
rupture on San Andreas Fault and one on the Hayward fault. Six levels of magnitude
from 6.0 to 8.5 have been studied adding up to a total of 24 scenario earthquakes.
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Hazards include ground shaking and liquefaction. Ground shaking is dependent
on factors such as the magnitude of the earthquake, the distance from the source and the
site, and site conditions. In our study area in particular, liquefaction is particularly
important. Liquefaction happens when a large amount of pressure is applied to the soil
and it starts behaving like a liquid which can lead to large displacements which in turn
can lead to the failure of the bridge.
Two types of costs are considered: direct and indirect costs. Direct costs come
from the actual repair of the bridge. This cost is calculated using the replacement cost of
a bridge as well as its expected level of damage. The level of damage is calculated based
off fragility curves which give an expected level of damage based on the intensity
measure (such as level of shaking or ground displacement) and the classification of a
bridge based on its general structural characteristics. Indirect damage originates from
measuring drivers’ delay and opportunity costs. In order to measure this, a four step
transportation model is used. This model, including a trip generation, trip distribution,
mode choice and traffic assignment step, predicts the flow rate throughout the network
which is essential to calculate indirect costs.
Performance criteria are useful for establishing goals that the resilience must
meet. Each of the four characteristics of resilience offers important insight into how the
network recovers. Robustness shows damage that occurs directly after the earthquake.
Robustness looks at the damage before any repair can be done so this means, for costs
that accumulate over time, it gives the maximum daily damage that will occur after an
earthquake. Robustness also predicts the base repair costs that will need to be spent in
order to repair every bridge back to its fully functional state. A clear connection between
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hazard level and robustness is established as earthquakes of larger magnitude and
earthquakes nearer to population centers are shown to have greater impact. Redundancy
is used as a measure of how strong the network is as a graph. Here, indices including the
alpha, beta and gamma index are used to quantitatively measure the redundancy of the
network and comparisons are made to networks of same aerial size including Los
Angeles, Reno and Boston. Resourcefulness is an aspect that ties into every other
dimension of resilience and represents the decision making capability and capacity to
provide

whatever

resources

necessary

to

accelerate

high

priority

projects.

Resourcefulness in this study was used to describe how well network owners prioritize
bridges for repair in the network and how well they used repair acceleration techniques to
help repair bridges faster. Rapidity is used to measure how quickly the performance of
the network returns to an acceptable level of performance and it becomes clear that this
topic ties in with resourcefulness as a more resourceful network should repair more
rapidly.
This study considers two types of acceleration techniques: incentivization and
accelerated bridge construction. Incentivization involves competitive A+B bidding which
reduces the expected repair time while paying the contractor a bonus for finishing ahead
of schedule. Using the ABC technique the project is accomplished in a relatively short
amount of time but increased construction costs are associated with it. Also compared are
a well prioritized and a poorly prioritized repair process. The well prioritized network
performed a significant amount better than the poorly prioritized network. This
emphasizes on the importance of preparation before the event in order to assess the
significance of each link in the network. It was shown that although the cost decreases
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with an increase of resourcefulness, the cost reduction results in diminishing returns. This
shows that while it is important to be as resourceful as possible, it is especially important
for relatively less resourceful networks to begin planning for seismic events in order to
reap the most effective benefits.
This study also looks into the effects of pre-event retrofit actions that result in
strengthening the network, hence increasing its robustness against earthquakes. A unique
contribution of this study is that instead of looking into the increase in resilience of
individual bridges, it takes a system level approach and considers the effect of retrofit on
performance of the network in its entirety. Retrofitting is a set of techniques often used to
strengthen bridges that have inadequate seismic strength or have deteriorated. Various
retrofit techniques such as column jacketing, restrainer cables, shear keys, and base
isolation are presented. These techniques are used across the seismically vulnerable
portions of the United States and studies have shown a clear link between retrofitting and
the fragility of bridges.
A novel retrofit selection algorithm was also created in this thesis. This algorithm
considers repair cost and network performance that can be used on a sizeable and
complex network. The sensitivities to hazard levels, repair cost, and effectiveness have
been considered. It was shown that at higher hazard levels, the need to retrofit is
especially pronounced while at lower hazard levels, the benefit is minimal. Furthermore,
the results showed that the retrofit scheme is very much affected by the cost of the retrofit
which highlights the need to develop cheap retrofit methods. The effectiveness of the
retrofit method was also important. The assumption that retrofitted bridges will not fail
during an earthquake can significantly overestimate the benefits of retrofitting.
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The retrofit scheme was tested across a portion of the San Francisco bay area. In
this study, the Hayward fault possesses a serious risk to the transportation network of the
Oakland area. A sizeable portion of the network was selected for retrofit with a method
akin to column jacketing was utilized to strengthen the bridges against this threat. It was
also shown that there is sensitivity in the selection process to risk as well as the cost and
effectiveness of retrofits. A higher risk area is suited better than a lower risk area to
retrofitting and a greater number of bridges are selected for retrofit. The benefit of
retrofitting was also shown to correlate positively with its effectiveness and negatively
with its cost.
Further work may be conducted to help further the study of resilience of
transportation networks. Topics related to the change of driver behavior in the days after
earthquake events are ongoing but incomplete. Traffic demand after an earthquake differs
from pre-event demand but in ways that is not fully understood. The effect of retrofitting
on fragility across a set of bridges that could be used to describe a network of a variety of
bridges is also a topic that can be further explored. Also helpful to the study would be the
implementation of different indirect costs and performance under one model. While other
studies have used measures such as accessibility, network capacity and connectivity
among other measures, connecting these different measures and comparing them in a
single model would allow for a more complete understanding of resilience.
This thesis shows clearly the impact that earthquakes have on seismically prone
areas and the consequences of not fully understanding the response the network would
have to earthquake events. Valuable contributions were made that describe the different
aspects of resilience as well as methods to increase the resilience of transportation
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networks. With these contributions, this thesis will help government agencies and other
network stakeholders prepare for seismic events by showing which aspects of the
network are most critical. Network owners will be able to evaluate how resilient the
network is and can use the model to test improvements to the network in order to better
withstand earthquakes.
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